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COURT TRANSPARENCY AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
David S. Ardia†

“Publicity is the very soul of justice,” legal philosopher Jeremy Bentham once
warned. 1 Regrettably, lady justice is at risk of losing her soul. In courts across the
country, secrecy is increasingly the norm. Indeed, the extent of secrecy in American
courts is astonishing, especially given the assumption by many that the First
Amendment guarantees a right of public access to the courts. In reality, the United
States Supreme Court has explicitly held only that there is a First Amendment right
of public access to criminal trials and pre-trial proceedings. The Court has never
addressed the question of whether there is a constitutional right of access to civil
proceedings or to court records. Moreover, the Court’s last pronouncement on this
issue occurred more than a quarter of a century ago and left the lower courts with a
confusing and inconsistent doctrinal roadmap for dealing with public access
questions. In the intervening decades, public access to the courts has been quietly
under siege.
This is a critical time for court transparency because the courts, like so many
institutions of government, are in the midst of a transformation from the largely
paper-based world of the twentieth century to an interconnected, electronic world
where physical and temporal barriers to information are disappearing. Not
surprisingly, the shift to electronic access to the courts raises significant privacy
concerns. As a result of these and other concerns, a number of courts and legislatures
are considering sharply limiting public access to certain court proceedings and
records.

† Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law, and Faculty CoDirector, UNC Center for Media Law and Policy. Thanks to Heidi Kitrosser, Anne Klinefelter,
Bill Marshall, Cathy Packer, Mary-Rose Papandrea, and participants at the 2016 Internet Law
Works-in-Progress Symposium at New York Law School for helpful comments and discussion.
Thank you also to Patrick Redmon, Maddie Salamone, Robert Sparks, and James Wudel for
exceptional research assistance.
1 4 JEREMY BENTHAM, Bentham’s Draught for the Organization of Judicial Establishments,
Compared with That of the National Assembly, with a Commentary on the Same, in THE WORKS
OF JEREMY BENTHAM 305, 316 (John Bowring ed., London, Simpkin, Marshall, & Co. 1843)
[hereinafter BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM].
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We can, however, put court transparency on a firm theoretical foundation by
focusing on the structural role the First Amendment plays in our constitutional
system. In doing so, this Article makes two related arguments. First, a central purpose
of the First Amendment is to ensure that citizens can effectively participate in and
contribute to our republican system of self-government. Second, in order to effectuate
this goal, the First Amendment must be understood to embody an affirmative right of
access to information held by the courts, which by virtue of their unique institutional
position possess information that is essential for the public to effectively evaluate the
workings of government and, therefore, to act as sovereigns over the government.
Drawing on these conclusions, this Article reworks existing First Amendment
doctrine to shift the emphasis away from the question of whether experience and
logic support a public right of access to individual judicial proceedings and records to
whether the structural benefits of court transparency are outweighed by the need for
secrecy. This reworking of public access doctrine provides a principled way for courts
to evaluate the interests in secrecy while at the same time ensuring that the public’s
right of access to the courts is retained.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
published an opinion in a lawsuit that, as far as the public knew, did not
exist. The case, Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc., 2 was kept so secret
over the course of seven years that it never appeared on a public docket.
By order of the district court, all proceedings were closed and all records
were sealed. 3 The case, and its extraordinary secrecy, only came to light
because the Third Circuit issued a decision reversing the district court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. 4 In the
penultimate paragraph of that decision, the Third Circuit affirmed the
district court’s sealing of the case, ruling that the judge did not abuse his
discretion even though he did not provide the public with notice and an
opportunity to be heard on the question of closure and did not issue any
on-the-record findings supporting his closure order. 5 And then, without
further explanation, the Third Circuit promptly sealed the appellate
record. 6
527 F.3d 358 (3d Cir.), order clarified, 543 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 2008).
If a member of the public or press attempted to find the case on the district court’s Public
Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) system, they would have received a message
saying either that no such case existed or that it was sealed. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
3, N.Y. Law Publ’g Co. v. Doe, 555 U.S. 1013 (2008) (No. 08-330), 2008 WL 4185426, at *3
[hereinafter Petition for Certiorari].
4 C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d at 361–62.
5 Id. at 371.
6 See Order, Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 543 F.3d 178 (2008) (Nos. 06-3625 & 06-4508)
(order filed on June 19, 2008 denying motion for intervention, for access to records and
proceedings, and to alter/amend opinion) (the order is available in Appendix B to the Petition
for Certiorari, supra note 3). The Third Circuit later modified its decision, stating: “It is not our
intention that the order we entered sealing the record on appeal would prevent the district
court from considering this issue anew . . . .” C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 543 F.3d at 179. The
district court did not modify its orders.
2
3
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C.A.R.S. Protection Plus did not involve state secrets or the nation’s
security. It did not involve confidential police informants or clandestine
law enforcement practices. It did not involve rape, child abuse, or lurid
sexual conduct. According to the Third Circuit, the case involved an
employment discrimination claim under Title VII, as amended by the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 7 brought by “Jane Doe,” who alleged
that her employer fired her because she had an abortion. 8 Undoubtedly,
the case contained sensitive information about the plaintiff’s medical
treatment and the unsympathetic actions of her employer, a car
warranty company, 9 but such details are common in employment
discrimination cases. 10
Beyond the basic facts described in the Third Circuit’s opinion, we
still know very little about this case. Thirteen days after the Third
Circuit revealed the lawsuit’s existence, the New York Law Publishing
Company, which publishes the Legal Intelligencer and Pennsylvania Law
Weekly, sought to intervene in the proceedings and challenge the
closure and sealing orders. 11 After the Third Circuit denied these
requests, New York Law Publishing filed a petition for certiorari with
the United States Supreme Court, asking the Court to decide whether
the blanket sealing of an entire case is constitutional under the First
Amendment. 12 The Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari
without further comment. 13 The case eventually settled and remains
under seal today.
If the Third Circuit can so casually dismiss public access in an
employment discrimination case, it prompts the troubling question of
how many other cases have been litigated in secret. As New York Law
Publishing asked in its petition for certiorari: “Is there a parallel justice
system at work here, visible and accountable to no one?” 14 This is no
idle concern. Judges across the country routinely close court
7 Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)).
8 C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d at 363. The plaintiff proceeded anonymously under the
pseudonym “Jane Doe.” See id. at 371 n.2.
9 Id. at 362.
10 See, e.g., Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2000) (noting that the
plaintiff’s discrimination claims “placed her medical condition at issue, making the [medical
records] sought by the [defendant] relevant, and absent a showing of bad faith, discoverable”).
Medical details are a common enough matter in employment discrimination cases that a
section on the discoverability of medical records is included in The American Law Institute
Continuing Legal Education course materials for evidentiary developments in employment
cases. See Richard T. Seymour, Recurring Discovery and Evidence Problems in Employment
Cases, SX001 A.L.I.-C.L.E. 529 (2015).
11 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 4.
12 Id. at i.
13 N.Y. Law Publ’g Co. v. Doe, 555 U.S. 1013 (2008).
14 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 15.
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proceedings and restrict public access to judicial records, including
sealing entire cases. 15 In recent years, it has come to light that some
courts have maintained secret dockets containing thousands of cases.
For example, after the Second Circuit held that the State of Connecticut
had been improperly sealing cases for decades, 16 the State’s courts
unsealed more than 10,000 cases that utilized secret dockets, most of
which dealt with divorce or family law issues involving public officials
and celebrities, including Clarence Clemons, Bruce Springsteen’s former
saxophonist. 17 As surprising as these statistics are, they do not even
begin to capture the far more common closure and sealing of individual
court proceedings and records that occur on a daily basis in courts
across the country. 18
Transparency is essential for the proper functioning of any judicial
system. As legal philosopher Jeremy Bentham wrote in the early
nineteenth century, “[p]ublicity is the very soul of justice.” 19 Without
public oversight over the judicial system, Bentham warned, “all other
checks are insufficient.”20 Public oversight of the courts serves many
salutary purposes, including ensuring that our system of justice
functions fairly and is accountable to the public. 21 But the benefits of
court transparency extend far beyond the courthouse. Public access to
the courts also allows the public to measure and evaluate governmental
(and private) power. This knowledge produces what Robert Post has
called “democratic competence,” which enables citizens to engage in
See discussion infra Section I.B.
Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2004).
17 See Rory Eastburg, Nothing to See Here, NEWS MEDIA & L., Winter 2009, at 34.
18 See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 629 F. App'x 69, 70 (2d Cir. 2015) (affirming district
court’s order closing courtroom and sealing records associated with pretrial criminal
proceeding); United States v. Nallani, No. 11-cr-20365, 2016 WL 4138227, at *6 (E.D. Mich.
Aug. 3, 2016) (ordering redaction of sentencing materials); United States v. Silver, No. 15-CR93 (VEC), 2016 WL 1572993, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2016) (ordering redaction of exhibits
presented to court during oral argument); United States v. Hoyt, No. 1:15-cr-1, 2016 WL
776595, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 29, 2016) (ordering redaction of portions of forensic mental
health evaluation); United States v. Grace, No. CR 05-07-M-DWM, 2009 WL 5697923, at *1 (D.
Mont. Feb. 27, 2009) (ordering closure of trial testimony of twenty-six witnesses); People v.
Asturias, No. A137391, 2015 WL 2148710, at *19 (Cal. Ct. App. May 7, 2015) (affirming trial
court’s closure of courtroom during testimony of minor victim's parents); Commonwealth v.
White, 33 N.E.3d 1265 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015) (ordering trial court to consider motion for a new
trial because jury selection was closed to the public and noting that a “long-time court officer in
that county had testified during the motion proceedings that the court room was routinely
closed to the public during general voir dire”).
19 BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, supra note 1, at 316.
20 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 524 (1827) (“Without publicity,
all other checks are insufficient: in comparison of publicity, all other checks are of small
account.”).
21 See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982) (“Public
scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of the factfinding
process, with benefits to both the defendant and to society as a whole.”).
15
16
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self-government, a goal that underlies the First Amendment’s
commitment to freedom of speech. 22
As C.A.R.S. Protection Plus demonstrates, lady justice is at risk of
losing her soul. Rather than being an exceptional case, C.A.R.S.
Protection Plus is emblematic of a court system that too frequently
devalues transparency. Indeed, the extent of secrecy in American courts
is astonishing, especially given the assumption by many commentators
that the First Amendment guarantees a right of public access to the
courts. 23 In fact, the United States Supreme Court has explicitly held
only that there is a First Amendment right of public access to criminal
trials and criminal trial-like proceedings. 24 The Supreme Court has
never addressed the question of whether there is a constitutional right of
access to civil proceedings or to court records. Moreover, the Court’s
last statement on this issue occurred more than a quarter of a century
ago, 25 and left the lower courts with a confusing and inconsistent
doctrinal roadmap for dealing with public access questions. In the
intervening decades, public access to the courts—and to government
information generally—has been quietly under siege.
Due to the Supreme Court’s shifting pronouncements on whether a
constitutional right of access to government information exists, public
access to the courts has been the subject of scholarly attention for
decades. 26 After the attacks on September 11, 2001, however, there was
22 ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 61 (2012) (“The value of democratic
competence is undermined whenever the state acts to interrupt the communication of
disciplinary knowledge that might inform the creation of public opinion.”).
23 See, e.g., Dan Klau, Opinion, Rebutting Misinformation About Crime Scene Photos and
FOIA, HERALD (New Britain, Conn.), Oct. 18, 2013, 2013 WLNR 26274091 (“[T]he public has a
First Amendment right of access to court proceedings and documents, including trial
exhibits.”); Emma Morehart, Justice Isn’t Served by Secrecy About Death Penalty, TULSA WORLD
(Apr. 16, 2015, 8:15 AM), http://www.tulsaworld.com/opinion/othervoices/emma-morehartjustice-isn-t-served-by-secrecy-about-death/article_4d58657a-e2bb-11e4-b394-17413999d
34f.html (“[T]he First Amendment [] demands a right of access to information in the
government’s hands.”); John Peck, Editorial, Court Records in the Amy Bishop Murder Case
Must Remain Open, HUNTSVILLE TIMES (Ala.) (June 12, 2011, 7:30 AM), http://blog.al.com/
times-views/2011/06/editorial_court_records_in_the.html (“The public and press have a First
Amendment right of access to court proceedings. That extends to the copious motions,
countermotions, depositions and other filings in the growing case file.”).
24 See discussion infra Section I.A.3.
25 See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
26 See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, An Informed Public, an Informing Press: The Search for a
Constitutional Principle, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 482 (1980); Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundations
of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 [hereinafter Emerson, Legal Foundations of the
Right to Know]; G. Michael Fenner & James L. Koley, Access to Judicial Proceedings: To
Richmond Newspapers and Beyond, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415 (1981); Anthony Lewis, A
Public Right to Know About Public Institutions: The First Amendment As Sword, 1980 SUP. CT.
REV. 1; Richard L. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 CORNELL L. REV.
1 (1983); Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts,
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an especially large outpouring of scholarship and commentary critical of
the government’s wholesale closure of deportation hearings and other
adjudications related to the “war on terror.” 27 These scholars argued,
based largely on doctrinal and normative grounds, that the right of
access to criminal proceedings should be extended to other adjudicatory
contexts. With few exceptions, 28 however, public access advocates have
not acknowledged that the current doctrinal and theoretical bases for a
First Amendment right of access are quite weak.
This Article strives to put court transparency on a firm theoretical
foundation by focusing on the structural role the First Amendment
plays in our constitutional system. It begins in Part I by describing the
constitutional framework for analyzing public access disputes and lays
bare the incoherence in the lower courts’ application of current
Supreme Court doctrine. The confusing state of the law on public access
is particularly evident in civil cases and in disputes over court records,
but inconsistency pervades the entire body of access law. Indeed, as one
commentator has noted, incoherence and confusion in the lower courts
regarding a First Amendment right of access “are troubling not only
because they lead to inconsistent and unpredictable results, but also
because such inconsistency suggests that the choice is outcomedriven.” 29
Part II examines the theories, or justifications, for a First
Amendment right of access to the courts, noting that a central purpose
of the First Amendment is to ensure that citizens can effectively
participate in and contribute to our republican system of selfgovernment. 30 Part II also traces the roots of constitutional
105 HARV. L. REV. 427 (1991); Stephen Wm. Smith, Kudzu in the Courthouse: Judgments Made
in the Shade, 3 FED. CTS. L. REV. 177 (2009).
27 See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy in the Immigration Courts and Beyond: Considering the
Right to Know in the Administrative State, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 95 (2004); Raleigh
Hannah Levine, Toward a New Public Access Doctrine, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1739 (2006);
Kathleen K. Olson, Courtroom Access After 9/11: A Pathological Perspective, 7 COMM. L. &
POL’Y 461 (2002); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Under Attack: The Public’s Right to Know and the
War on Terror, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 35 (2005); Susan Dente Ross, Secrecy’s Assault on the
Constitutional Right to Open Trials, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 351 (2004).
28 See Kitrosser, supra note 27, passim (arguing that access denials to adjudicative
proceedings are presumptively unconstitutional under a structuralist view of the First
Amendment); Levine, supra note 27, at 1758–81 (noting the inconsistency and incoherence in
the lower courts’ approach to access claims).
29 Levine, supra note 27, at 1742.
30 This theory of the First Amendment is most commonly associated with Alexander
Meiklejohn. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (Oxford Univ. Press 1965) (1960). It is not my contention that this is
the only purpose underlying the First Amendment. Other purposes are clearly evident in the
Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, including “advancing knowledge,”
“discovering truth,” and “assuring individual self-fulfillment.” THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970). I return to these purposes in Part II.
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structuralism and identifies the structural values of court transparency.
For First Amendment structuralists, “access denials are significant not
because they directly restrain speech but because they threaten the
preconditions of speech facilitative of self-government and the checking
of government abuse.”31 The judiciary is the most insular branch of our
government, and public access provides an important source of
information for citizens to understand how the government exercises
power across a broad range of societal activities. Without public access
to such information, not only would the courts lack legitimacy, but our
democratic system of government would as well. It is this latter point—
that public access to the courts serves essential structural values by
making self-governance possible—that differentiates the approach in
this Article from the customary arguments offered in support of public
access, which rely on the benefits of access to individual court
proceedings or to the court system. 32
Part II also answers a question that has vexed constitutional
scholars for decades: Is the First Amendment implicated only when the
government acts to censor or punish speech, or does the First
Amendment also require recognition that speech about the government
must be informed by information from the government? Drawing on
the Supreme Court’s public access decisions, as well as the work of First
Amendment theorists, this Article asserts that the First Amendment
embodies an affirmative obligation on the part of the government to
ensure that public discussion of the courts is well informed. In order to
effectuate this goal, the First Amendment must be understood to
embody a right of access to information held by the courts, which, by
virtue of their unique institutional position, possess information that is
essential for the public to effectively evaluate the workings of
government.
Part III concludes by recasting public access doctrine in the mold
of First Amendment structuralism. In doing so, it suggests that rather
than attempt to evaluate whether public access plays a positive role in a
particular court proceeding, judges should hold that a First Amendment
right of access attaches to all court proceedings and records that are
Kitrosser, supra note 27, at 99.
See, e.g., M.A. “Mike” Kautsch, Press Freedom and Fair Trials in Kansas: How Media and
the Courts Have Struggled to Resolve Competing Claims of Constitutional Rights, 57 KAN. L.
REV. 1075, 1085–88 (2009); Marcus, supra note 26, at 41–53; Miller, supra note 26, at 483–90;
Ross, supra note 27, at 391–92; Smith, supra note 26, at 214–15; Paul Coppock, Article, Doors to
Remain Open During Business Hours: Maintaining the Media's (and Public's) First Amendment
Right of Access in the Face of Changing Technology, 58 S.D. L. REV. 319, 337–38 (2013); Nicole J.
Dulude, Comment, Unlocking America's Courthouse Doors: Restoring a Presumption of First
Amendment Access as a Means of Reviving Public Faith in the Judiciary, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U.
L. REV. 193, 227–29 (2005).
31
32
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material to a court’s exercise of its adjudicatory power. Recognizing a
constitutional right of public access does not require, however, that
court proceedings and records must always be open to the public. When
the countervailing interests in secrecy are sufficiently compelling, a
court can limit public access, but it should do so only rarely.
This recasting of public access doctrine is particularly important
because courts, like so many institutions of government, are in the midst
of a transformation from the largely paper-based world of the twentieth
century to an interconnected, electronic world where physical and
temporal barriers to information are diminishing. Not surprisingly, the
shift to electronic access to court proceedings and records can raise
significant privacy concerns. 33 As a result of these concerns, a number of
courts and legislatures have sharply limited public access to certain
proceedings and records. 34 A reinvigorated public access right grounded
in a structural interpretation of the First Amendment will help to ensure
that courts take into account the full range of benefits that come from
court transparency.
I. PUBLIC ACCESS TO THE COURTS
The idea that the public has an interest in observing the operation
of the courts is hardly controversial. From at least the time of Roman
law, trials have been public events, res publica. 35 Public access to court
proceedings has been the rule in England since “time immemorial,” 36
and is regarded there as “one of the essential qualities of a court of
justice.”37 Indeed, as discussed in the Sections that follow, American
33 See David S. Ardia & Anne Klinefelter, Privacy and Court Records: An Empirical Study,
30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1807, 1825–26, 1882–90 (2015) (discussing the wide range of privacy
interests implicated by public access to the courts).
34 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 610.070 (West 2016) (closing juvenile delinquency and
dependency proceedings); MD. CT. R. 16-906 (listing categories of cases in which court records
are not publicly accessible, including adoption, guardianship, child abuse, and attorney
grievance matters); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-2-1323 (West 2009) (sealing records of supervision
proceedings by the insurance commissioner); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. Lᴀᴡ § 160.50(1) (McKinney
2004) (sealing records in criminal cases decided in favor of the accused); In re J. S., 438 A.2d
1125, 1131 (Vt. 1981) (“The juvenile shield law does not give the court below discretion to
make the proceedings public.”).
35 See Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) (“A trial is a public event. What transpires
in the court room is public property.”); BRUCE W. FRIER, THE RISE OF THE ROMAN JURISTS:
STUDIES IN CICERO’S PRO CAECINA 57–62 (1985) (“[T]he Urban Praetor’s court was set up in
the open air at the southeastern end of the Forum . . . .”).
36 Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1069 (3d Cir. 1984) (quoting EDWARD
JENCKS, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 73–74 (Paul B. Fairest ed., 6th ed. 1967)).
37 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 567 (1980) (quoting Daubney v.
Cooper (1829) 109 Eng. Rep. 438, 440 (KB)).
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jurists have long recognized that open courts serve many important
societal interests.
The conclusion that the public has a First Amendment right to
access the courts, however, is controversial. Although commentators
often assume that such a right exists, 38 judges and scholars continue to
debate whether the Constitution requires that the courts be open to the
public. The disagreement over a First Amendment right of access to the
courts can be traced to three divergent lines of Supreme Court cases
addressing a constitutional right of access to government information.
The first is a series of cases from the 1970s in which the Court held that
the First Amendment does not prevent the government from restricting
press access to prisoners and prisons. 39 In the second line of cases, the
Court expanded on its decisions in the prison access cases, holding that
there is no constitutional right to obtain information from the
government generally. 40 In a third series of cases in the 1980s, however,
the Court took a decidedly different tack when confronted with the
question of public access to criminal trials and pre-trial proceedings. 41
This Part examines the roots of this debate and describes the
Supreme Court’s constitutional framework for analyzing public access
claims. It also explores how the lower courts have applied the Supreme
Court’s doctrinal framework, revealing that many judges are resistant to
the idea that there is a First Amendment right of access, especially to
civil proceedings and court records.

See supra note 23.
See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (plurality opinion) (finding no
constitutional violation by county jail that refused to allow press to interview inmates); Saxbe v.
Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (rejecting constitutional challenge to federal prison
regulation prohibiting face-to-face interviews by the press); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817
(1974) (rejecting constitutional challenge to state prison regulation under which media
representatives were able to interview inmates, but were unable to select particular inmates, and
prisoner himself could not initiate interview).
40 See McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709, 1718 (2013) (“[T]here is no constitutional right
to obtain all the information provided by FOIA laws.”); L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting
Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 40 (1999) (stating the government could decide “not to give out
[police department] arrestee information at all”).
41 See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (holding that First Amendment provides a right
of access to preliminary hearings); Press-Enter. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S.
501 (1984) (finding right of access to jury voir dire); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,
457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982) (recognizing right of access to criminal trials); Richmond Newspapers,
448 U.S. at 580 (same).
38
39

ARDIA.38.3.1 (Do Not Delete)

2017]

3/8/2017 6:33 PM

COURT TRANSPARENCY
A.

845

Constitutional Framework

Ever since the Supreme Court first invoked the Constitution’s
protections to invalidate a government restriction on speech in 1931,42
scholars have debated whether the First Amendment, in addition to
prohibiting direct government censorship, also includes a right to
acquire information. Beginning in the 1960s, the Court heard a series of
cases that tested whether such a right exists, but “the Court responded
in a remarkably erratic and fragmented way.” 43
1.

A Right to Information Generally

One of the first access to information cases to reach the Supreme
Court, Zemel v. Rusk, involved a challenge to the U.S. government’s
travel ban to Cuba. 44 While this might seem like an odd case for testing
whether the First Amendment provides a right to gather information,
the plaintiff explicitly couched his claim in terms of the First
Amendment, asserting that the travel ban interfered with “the First
Amendment rights of citizens to travel abroad so that they might
acquaint themselves at first hand with the effects abroad of our
Government’s policies, foreign and domestic, and with conditions
abroad which might affect such policies.” 45 Although the Court agreed
that the travel restrictions “render[ed] less than wholly free the flow of
information concerning [Cuba],” 46 the Court stated that the
government’s prohibition on travel did not implicate the First
Amendment because it was merely “an inhibition of action.”47
According to the Court, even though the government’s travel restriction
“diminishes the citizen’s opportunities to gather information,” this does
not raise First Amendment concerns: “The right to speak and publish
does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information.” 48
Less than a decade later, the Court appeared to retreat from this
hardline position in Branzburg v. Hayes. 49 Branzburg involved the
42 Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 703, 706 (1931) (invalidating Minnesota
law that provided for injunctions against those who created a “public nuisance” by publishing,
selling, or distributing a “malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper”).
43 Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards a
Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 251 (2004).
44 Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
45 Id. at 16.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 17.
49 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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consolidation of four cases brought by journalists who claimed that the
First Amendment protected them from having to identify their
confidential sources before a grand jury. The journalists argued that
compelling them to testify would unduly burden their right to gather
news by deterring their sources from providing information “to the
detriment of the free flow of information protected by the First
Amendment.” 50 In a 5-4 decision, the Court declined to recognize a
privilege for journalists in the context of grand jury investigations,
noting that even those who gather the news must comply with civil and
criminal statutes of general applicability. 51 Citing Zemel, the Court went
on to state that “[i]t has generally been held that the First Amendment
does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to
information not available to the public generally.” 52
Yet the Branzburg Court seemed to evidence some ambivalence
about the reach of its holding in Zemel. Utilizing language that has
perplexed lawyers who represent the press for nearly half a century,53
the Court stated:
We do not question the significance of free speech, press, or assembly
to the country’s welfare. Nor is it suggested that news gathering does
not qualify for First Amendment protection; without some
protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be
eviscerated. 54

The Court’s suggestion in Branzburg that there might be some
limits on the government’s ability to restrict newsgathering activity,
however, did not presage an immediate change in the Court’s approach

Id. at 680.
Id. at 682 (“[N]either the First Amendment nor any other constitutional provision
protects the average citizen from disclosing to a grand jury information that he has received in
confidence.”).
52 Id. at 684.
53 See, e.g., James C. Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qualified Privilege for
Newsmen, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 709, 716 (1975) (“Justice Stewart called the Powell opinion
‘enigmatic.’ It is opaque at best. Since it is, however, the key to understanding Branzburg, an
attempt must be made to penetrate it.” (footnote omitted)); Donna M. Murasky, The
Journalist’s Privilege: Branzburg and Its Aftermath, 52 TEX. L. REV. 829, 842 (1974) (“In its
Branzburg decision the Supreme Court, without adequate explanation or justification, departed
from previously announced principles of constitutional adjudication.”); John E. Osborn, The
Reporter’s Confidentiality Privilege: Updating the Empirical Evidence After a Decade of
Subpoenas, 17 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 57, 61 (1985) (“[T]he case law in the aftermath of
Branzburg has thus far failed to provide clear and consistent guidelines for editors and
reporters forced to choose between disclosure or possible incarceration.”).
54 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681. Returning to this idea at the end of its decision, the Court
again remarked that “news gathering is not without its First Amendment protections, and
grand jury investigations if instituted or conducted other than in good faith, would pose wholly
different issues for resolution under the First Amendment.” Id. at 707.
50
51
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to the First Amendment. In fact, “[s]omewhat paradoxically,” 55 the
Court held shortly after Branzburg that when the information at issue is
held by the government, 56 no First Amendment rights are implicated. 57
2.

A Right to Information from the Government

In Pell v. Procunier 58 and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 59 a
newspaper publisher and several reporters challenged various prison
regulations that restricted their ability to interview inmates who had not
been specifically made available by the prisons. Invoking the First
Amendment’s speech and press clauses, the petitioners asserted that
“the press have a constitutional right to interview any inmate who is
willing to speak with them, in the absence of an individualized
determination that the particular interview might create a clear and
present danger to prison security or to some other substantial interest
served by the corrections system.” 60 Justice Potter Stewart, writing for 54 majorities in both cases, declined to recognize that the First
Amendment provided the press with a right of access to the requested
information. 61 Although Stewart acknowledged that in Branzburg the
Court had suggested that newsgathering was entitled to some First
Amendment protection, he saw the issue in Pell and Saxbe as whether
the press had a constitutional right of access that was greater than that
afforded the general public. 62 Without clarifying the extent of the
public’s right of access, Justice Stewart rejected this superior access
argument, stating that the Constitution did not “require [the]
government to accord the press special access to information not shared
by members of the public generally.” 63
Given Justice Stewart’s characterization of the issue in Pell and
Saxbe as involving special press access, the Court’s decisions in those
cases arguably left open the possibility that the First Amendment might
be implicated if the government refused to provide any public access to
McDonald, supra note 43, at 251.
Both Zemel and Branzburg dealt with claims that the government was unduly interfering
with access to information that was outside of the government’s direct control.
57 See discussion infra Section I.A.2.
58 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (rejecting constitutional challenge to state prison regulation under
which media representatives were able to interview inmates, but were unable to select particular
inmates, and prisoner himself could not initiate interview).
59 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (rejecting constitutional challenge to federal prison regulation
prohibiting face-to-face interviews by the press).
60 Pell, 417 U.S. at 829.
61 See id. at 833; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 850.
62 Pell, 417 U.S. at 833–34; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 849–50.
63 Pell, 417 U.S. at 834; see also Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 850.
55
56
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the prisons. 64 In Houchins v. KQED, Inc., however, a fractured court
seemed to snuff out any glimmer of a First Amendment right of access
to information under such circumstances. 65 In Houchins, a broadcasting
company and members of the NAACP sued a sheriff who refused to
provide access to a portion of a county jail that had been the site of a
recent suicide by an inmate, as well as the subject of allegations
regarding deplorable prison conditions. 66 Emphasizing the public
interest at stake, the plaintiffs argued that the sheriff “had violated the
First Amendment by refusing to permit media access and failing to
provide any effective means by which the public could be informed of
conditions prevailing in the [prison] facility or learn of the prisoners’
grievances.” 67 They further asserted that “[p]ublic access to such
information was essential . . . in order for NAACP members to
participate in the public debate on jail conditions in Alameda County.” 68
In a 4-3 decision that failed to produce a majority opinion, 69 the
Court rejected the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims. Writing for a
plurality of three justices, Chief Justice Warren Burger stated that “[t]his
Court has never intimated a First Amendment guarantee of a right of
access to all sources of information within government control.” 70

64 The Court concluded at the outset of its analysis in Pell that the government was not
attempting to conceal prison conditions or to frustrate the press’ investigation and reporting of
those conditions because “both the press and the general public [were] accorded full
opportunities to observe prison conditions.” Pell, 417 U.S. at 830. The Court made similar
observations in Saxbe:

The policies of the Federal Bureau of Prisons regarding visitations to prison inmates
do not differ significantly from the California policies considered in Pell v.
Procunier . . . . Indeed, journalists are given access to the prisons and to prison
inmates that in significant respects exceeds that afforded to members of the general
public.
417 U.S. at 846–47.
65 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (plurality opinion) (finding no constitutional violation by county jail
that refused to allow the press to interview inmates and make sound recordings, films, and
photographs).
66 Id. at 3–6.
67 Id. at 4.
68 Id.
69 Justices Marshall and Blackmun did not participate in the case.
70 Houchins, 438 U.S. at 9. Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment, but declined to join
the plurality opinion. Id. at 16–19 (Stewart, J., concurring). Nevertheless, he agreed with the
plurality that:
The First and Fourteenth Amendments do not guarantee the public a right of access
to information generated or controlled by government, nor do they guarantee the
press any basic right of access superior to that of the public generally. The
Constitution does no more than assure the public and the press equal access once
government has opened its doors.
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Characterizing the language in Branzburg as dictum, Burger asserted
that the decision in Branzburg
in no sense implied a constitutional right of access to news
sources. . . . There is an undoubted right to gather news “from any
source by means within the law,” but that affords no basis for the
claim that the First Amendment compels others—private persons or
governments—to supply information. 71

Burger then went on to note that “[w]hether the government should
open penal institutions in the manner sought by respondents is a
question of policy which a legislative body might appropriately resolve
one way or the other.”72
The Court applied similar reasoning in Nixon v. Warner
Communications, Inc., 73 where it held that the press had no First
Amendment right to obtain physical copies of tape recordings made by
President Nixon that the media had heard when they were played in
open court. 74 Citing, inter alia, Pell, Saxbe, and Zemel, the Court
concluded that “[t]he First Amendment generally grants the press no
right to information about a trial superior to that of the general
public.” 75 Because the tapes had already been played in open court, the
Court concluded that no further public or press access was necessary. 76
Although Nixon, like Pell and Saxbe before it, appeared to leave
open the possibility that the First Amendment might be implicated if
the government refused to provide any public access to the White
House tape recordings, the Court rejected such a right in Los Angeles
Police Department v. United Reporting Publishing Corp. 77 In United
Reporting, a commercial data broker challenged a California statute that
imposed restrictions on the use of arrestee addresses collected by the
Los Angeles Police Department. 78 In dismissing the publisher’s First
Amendment claim, the Court remarked that “what we have before us is
Id. at 16. Stewart explained in a footnote that “[f]orces and factors other than the Constitution
must determine what government-held data are to be made available to the public.” Id. at 16
n.*.
71 Id. at 10–11 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
72 Id. at 12.
73 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
74 Id. at 609. Twenty-two hours of taped conversations were played at the trial and admitted
into evidence. Id. at 594.
75 Id. at 609.
76 Id. at 610. The respondents also argued that release of the tapes was required by the Sixth
Amendment guarantee of a public trial. Id. According to the Court, any right of public access
under the Sixth Amendment had been satisfied: “The requirement of a public trial is satisfied
by the opportunity of members of the public and the press to attend the trial and to report what
they have observed. That opportunity abundantly existed here.” Id. (citation omitted).
77 528 U.S. 32, 40 (1999).
78 Id. at 34–36.
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nothing more than a governmental denial of access to information in its
possession.” 79 Removing any doubt that the First Amendment might
encompass the right to demand this information from the government,
the Court went on to opine that “California could decide not to give out
arrestee information at all without violating the First Amendment.” 80
The Court’s most recent pronouncement on the question of public
access to government information occurred in 2013 in McBurney v.
Young, 81 and left little reason to think the Court is willing to revisit its
rejection of a general First Amendment right of access to government
information. Although McBurney involved a challenge under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause and dormant Commerce Clause to
Virginia’s requirement that only citizens of Virginia are allowed to
request information under the state’s Freedom of Information Act, the
Court rejected the idea that there is a general constitutional right to
obtain information from the government under the First Amendment.
In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Alito, the Court wrote:
[W]e reject petitioners’ sweeping claim that the challenged provision
of the Virginia FOIA violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause
because it denies them the right to access public information on
equal terms with citizens of the Commonwealth. We cannot agree
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause covers this broad right.
This Court has repeatedly made clear that there is no constitutional
right to obtain all the information provided by FOIA laws. 82

If we were to end our analysis here, we would conclude that the
question of whether the First Amendment encompasses a right to
acquire information from the government has been answered in the
negative. But in a parallel line of cases, the Court has carved out one
area of government activity that the public is entitled to access under the
First Amendment: criminal trials and criminal trial-like proceedings.

Id. at 40.
Id. (citing Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 14 (1978) (plurality opinion)). Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion and was joined by six other Justices, all of whom
wrote or joined concurring opinions. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices O’Connor, Souter,
and Breyer, concluded that the fact that the statute at issue was “properly analyzed as a
restriction on access to government information, not as a restriction on protected speech,” was
sufficient grounds in and of itself for rejecting the publisher’s First Amendment claim. Id. at 42
(Ginsburg, J., concurring). In their view, “California could, as the Court notes, constitutionally
decide not to give out arrestee address information at all.” Id. at 43.
81 133 S. Ct. 1709 (2013).
82 Id. at 1718 (citing Houchins, 438 U.S. at 14).
79
80
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A Right to Information from the Courts

As an initial matter, it would appear that the Sixth Amendment,
which states that the accused in all criminal prosecutions has “the right
to a speedy and public trial,” 83 provides a right of public access to the
courts. But the Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court held in Gannett
Co. v. DePasquale, 84 merely grants a criminal defendant the right to a
public trial, it does not give members of the public a right to attend the
proceedings. 85 “The Constitution nowhere mentions any right of access
to a criminal trial on the part of the public,” the Court observed in
Gannett. 86 “Its guarantee, like the others enumerated, is personal to the
accused.” 87
Although the Court refused to allow the press or public to object to
the closure of criminal proceedings under the Sixth Amendment,
Gannett marked an important shift in the Court’s approach to a First
Amendment right of access. Unlike in the prison access cases, where the
media plaintiffs had argued that they have a First Amendment right of
access to government information beyond that provided to the public,
Gannett involved a claim that the closure of a pre-trial suppression
hearing in a murder case violated the public’s right of access under the
First and Sixth Amendments. 88 Even though the Gannett decision came
down only a year after Houchins, the Court appeared to be more
receptive to a right of public access to the courts, at least in the context
of criminal proceedings. Instead of rejecting the Gannett Company’s
First Amendment claim outright, Justice Stewart, who had concurred in
the judgment in Houchins, 89 expressly declined to address the question
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
443 U.S. 368 (1979).
85 Id. at 383–86, 391. As a leading media law casebook reports, the Court’s decision in
Gannett was widely criticized by the media:
83
84

The aftermath of Gannett was extraordinary. The decision came under severe media
criticism. In August 1979, the American Newspaper Publishers Association reported
that “[j]udges all over the United States have closed or upheld the closing of more
than 21 courtrooms in the five weeks since the U.S. Supreme Court’s July 2 decision
in Gannett.” Shortly thereafter, a number of the Justices began speaking out in public
about the Gannett decision. In August 1979, for example, Chief Justice Burger
commented to a reporter that judges who were closing trials might be misreading
Gannett. In an article in Editor and Publisher, Justice Brennan suggested that Gannett
involved only the Sixth Amendment, not the First, and Justice Stevens published an
article in Bar Leader magazine discussing the case.
DAVID KOHLER ET AL., MEDIA AND THE LAW 948 (2d ed. 2014).
86 Gannett, 443 U.S. at 379.
87 Id. at 379–80.
88 Id. at 370–71, 391.
89 Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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of whether the closure of the pre-trial proceeding violated the First
Amendment: “[E]ven assuming, arguendo, that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments may guarantee such access in some situations, a question
we do not decide, this putative right was given all appropriate deference
by the state nisi prius court in the present case.” 90
For the first time since the Court’s vague admonition in Branzburg
that there must be “some protection” under the First Amendment for
newsgathering, 91 Justice Stewart’s opinion in Gannett explicitly
acknowledged the possibility that the public might have a right of access
to judicial proceedings under the First Amendment. 92 In a series of cases
that came to the Court over the following decade, the Court tackled this
question head on, concluding that the First Amendment’s press and
speech clause guarantees do necessitate a public right to attend criminal
trials and other types of criminal proceedings. 93
The first of these cases, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
involved the exclusion of the press and public from a murder trial in
Virginia state court. 94 In a 7-1 decision 95 that produced four separate
opinions, the Court held that the public has a First Amendment right of
access to criminal trials. 96 Chief Justice Burger, who wrote the plurality
opinion, began by scrutinizing the history of the American and English
criminal justice systems and concluded that “the historical evidence
demonstrates conclusively that . . . criminal trials both here and in
England had long been presumptively open” to the public. 97 This
openness, Burger observed, provided “significant community
therapeutic value,” 98 “gave assurance that the proceedings were
conducted fairly to all concerned, and . . . discouraged perjury, the
misconduct of participants, and decisions based on secret bias or
partiality.” 99
Although Burger conceded in Richmond Newspapers that the First
Amendment does not explicitly require public access to criminal trials,
he concluded that the Amendment’s provisions implied that such a right
exists: “In guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech and press, the
Gannett, 443 U.S. at 392.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
92 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
93 See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1 (1986); Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982); Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia,
448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion).
94 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555.
95 Justice Powell did not participate in the case.
96 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575–76.
97 Id. at 569.
98 Id. at 570.
99 Id. at 569; see also id. at 571 (noting that public scrutiny of criminal trials fostered
“acceptance of both the process and its results”).
90
91
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First Amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to
attend trials so as to give meaning to those explicit guarantees.” 100 In
doing so, Burger’s plurality decision in Richmond Newspapers diverged
sharply from the Court’s parallel line of cases rejecting a First
Amendment right of access to information controlled by the
government. 101 At least in the context of criminal trials, Richmond
Newspapers foreshadowed a far broader understanding of the First
Amendment that protects not just the right to speak, but also the right
to acquire information. The First Amendment, Burger wrote, “goes
beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals to
prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from which
members of the public may draw.” 102
Two years later, in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, a
majority of the Court adopted this view of the First Amendment when it
invalidated a Massachusetts statute that required trial judges, at trials for
specified sexual offenses involving a victim under the age of eighteen, to
exclude the public from the courtroom during the testimony of the
victim. 103 In striking down the statute, Justice William Brennan’s
majority opinion affirmed that the First Amendment is “broad enough
to encompass those rights that, while not unambiguously enumerated in
the very terms of the Amendment, are nonetheless necessary to the
enjoyment of other First Amendment rights.” 104 Underlying the First
Amendment right of access to criminal trials, Brennan noted, “is the
common understanding that ‘a major purpose of that Amendment was
to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.’” 105 Echoing
Burger’s plurality decision in Richmond Newspapers, Brennan remarked
that a right of public access helps to ensure that the “constitutionally
protected ‘discussion of governmental affairs’ is an informed one.”106
The Court’s decisions in Richmond Newspapers and Globe
Newspaper left unresolved the question of how far a First Amendment
right of access to the courts extends. Both cases involved access to
criminal trials, which have historically been open to the public. Yet the
question of public access also arises in other types of court proceedings.
The first case to arrive at the Court testing the reach of the First
Id. at 575.
See discussion supra Section I.A.2.
102 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575–76 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)); see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) (noting in
dictum that “without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be
eviscerated”).
103 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
104 Id. at 604 (citing Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 579–80).
105 Id. (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
106 Id. at 605.
100
101
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Amendment’s right of public access to the courts involved criminal voir
dire proceedings and was followed shortly thereafter by a second case
arising from a preliminary hearing.
In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 107 a
trial judge closed nearly all of the voir dire proceedings in a case
involving the rape and murder of a teenage girl based on the stated
belief that if the press were present in the courtroom, jurors “would lack
the candor necessary to assure a fair trial.” 108 In a unanimous decision,
the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment right of access
extends to criminal voir dire proceedings. The Court first noted that
public jury selection was the “common practice in America when the
Constitution was adopted,” and emphasized that openness “enhances
both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of
fairness so essential to public confidence in the system.” 109
Two years later, in the identically named Press-Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 110 the Supreme Court faced the
question of whether a First Amendment right of access applies to
preliminary hearings. 111 In that case, a magistrate judge excluded the
public, pursuant to a California statute, from a forty-one day
preliminary hearing in a high-profile murder prosecution in order to
protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial. 112 At the conclusion of the
hearing, the judge refused to release the transcript of the hearing and
sealed the record. 113
Pulling the various strands together from Richmond Newspapers,
Globe Newspaper, and Press-Enterprise I, Chief Justice Burger set out to
clarify the test for determining whether a First Amendment right of
access applies to a specific judicial proceeding. Explicating what is now
known as the “tests of experience and logic,”114 Burger wrote: “our
decisions have emphasized two complementary considerations.” 115 First,
a court is to consider “whether the place and process have historically

464 U.S. 501 (1984).
Id. at 503–04. The voir dire took six weeks, and all but approximately three days was
closed to the public. Id. at 503. Citing the jurors’ right to privacy, the judge also refused to
release the transcript of the proceedings even after the trial began and continued to keep the
transcript under seal post-conviction. Id. at 503–04.
109 Id. at 508 (citing Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569–71).
110 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
111 Id. at 3.
112 Id. at 3–4.
113 Id. at 4–5.
114 See, e.g., El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147, 149 (1993) (referring to
the “tests of experience and logic” enunciated in Press-Enterprise II).
115 Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8.
107
108
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been open to the press and general public” (the “experience” prong). 116
Second, the court must assess “whether public access plays a significant
positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question”
(the “logic” prong). 117 If both prongs are met, a First Amendment right
of access attaches to the proceeding in question, which can be denied
only if the government’s justification for closure withstands strict
scrutiny. As Burger observed: “These considerations of experience and
logic are, of course, related, for history and experience shape the
functioning of governmental processes. If the particular proceeding in
question passes these tests of experience and logic, a qualified First
Amendment right of public access attaches.” 118
Examining California’s and other states’ practices with regard to
preliminary hearings, Burger concluded that such hearings have
historically been open to the public and thus the “experience” prong was
satisfied. 119 Turning to the “logic” prong, he determined that in
California preliminary hearings are “sufficiently like a trial to justify
the . . . conclusion” that public access “is essential to the proper
functioning of the criminal justice system.”120 Burger rejected the
argument that public access to a preliminary hearing is unnecessary
because the hearing cannot result in the conviction of the accused and it
is held before a magistrate without a jury, noting that “these features,
standing alone, do not make public access any less essential to the
proper functioning of the proceedings in the overall criminal justice
process.” 121 To the contrary, the absence of a jury, Burger observed,
“makes the importance of public access to a preliminary hearing even
more significant.” 122 Finding both prongs satisfied, the Court held that a
qualified First Amendment right of access attached to the preliminary
hearing. 123
Since Press-Enterprise I and II, the Supreme Court has not revisited
its conclusion that the First Amendment provides a qualified right of
access to criminal trials and trial-like proceedings, nor has the Court
116 Id. (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605 (1982) and
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 589 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring in
judgment)).
117 Id. (citing Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606).
118 Id. at 9.
119 Id. at 10–11.
120 Id. at 11–12. The Court noted that in California a defendant “has an absolute right to an
elaborate preliminary hearing before a neutral magistrate. . . . [and] has the right to personally
appear at the hearing, to be represented by counsel, to cross-examine hostile witnesses, to
present exculpatory evidence, and to exclude illegally obtained evidence.” Id. at 12 (citation
omitted).
121 Id. at 12.
122 Id. at 13.
123 Id.
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had occasion to resolve whether the experience and logic test mandates
a right of access to other judicial activities, including civil proceedings
and court records. In El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico, 124 the
Court did clarify one possible ambiguity in the application of the
“experience” prong of the Press-Enterprise II standard, instructing that
when assessing the historical record for a “tradition of open[ness],” 125 a
court “does not look to the particular practice of any one jurisdiction,
but instead ‘to the experience in that type or kind of hearing throughout
the United States.’” 126
In summary, the Supreme Court’s decisions addressing a putative
First Amendment right of access to information paint a conflicting
doctrinal picture. In Zemel, the Court held that governmental
restrictions on information-gathering activities do not implicate the
First Amendment. 127 In Branzburg, however, the Court suggested that
newsgathering activities are entitled to at least some First Amendment
protection, although the Court did not clarify the extent of this
protection. 128 In the prison access cases (Pell, Saxbe, and Houchins) and
government records cases (Nixon, United Reporting, and McBurney) the
Court seemed to reverse course again by holding that any First
Amendment protection for gathering information did not extend to
information held by the government. 129
Against this backdrop, Richmond Newspapers, Globe Newspaper,
and Press-Enterprise I & II stand out as outliers in the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence concerning a First Amendment right of access to
information. In order to make sense of these decisions, we must ask
what it is about criminal trials and the information they generate that
distinguish them from other governmental activities that are not subject
to a First Amendment right of access. To answer this question, it will be
helpful first to examine how the lower courts are applying the
experience and logic test.
B.

Application in the Lower Courts

Lower courts have struggled to make sense of the Supreme Court’s
conflicting guidance on whether a First Amendment right of access to
government information exists. This Section summarizes the most
124
125
126
127
128
129

508 U.S. 147 (1993).
Id. at 150.
Id. (quoting Rivera-Puig v. Garcia-Rosario, 983 F.2d 311, 323 (1st Cir. 1992)).
See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 49–55 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 58–82 and accompanying text.
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important trends in these decisions and highlights patterns in how
judges resolve disputes over public access to the courts.
As a starting point, it is clear that lower courts treat the three
branches of government dissimilarly when it comes to claims that the
First Amendment provides a right of public access. Most courts, for
example, refuse to recognize a First Amendment right of access to the
activities of the executive and legislative branches, relying on either the
outright rejection of such a right in Houchins and United Reporting, 130
or by finding that the government activity at issue does not pass the
experience and logic test from Press-Enterprise II. 131 Although there may
be good reason to question the refusal to recognize a First Amendment
right of access to government information in some of these contexts, 132
those arguments can be left to another day because the focus here is on a
right of public access to court proceedings and records.
With regard to the activities of the judicial branch, lower courts
frequently do find a First Amendment right of access. 133 Nevertheless,
due to the Supreme Court’s opaque guidance on when and why such a
right exists, courts vary substantially with regard to how they evaluate
First Amendment access claims. The chaotic state of the law on public
access is particularly evident in cases involving access to civil
proceedings and in disputes over the sealing of court records, 134 but
inconsistency pervades the entire body of court access law. Indeed,
scholars have described the lower courts’ application of the Supreme
Court’s access precedents as “convoluted,” 135 “confus[ed],” 136 and

130 See, e.g., Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 935 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (rejecting First Amendment right of access to names of detainees); Amelkin v. McClure,
205 F.3d 293, 296 (6th Cir. 2000) (no First Amendment right of access to state accident
reports); Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164, 1171–73 (3d Cir. 1986) (no First
Amendment right of access to state environmental agency’s records pertaining to water
contamination); United States v. Loughner, 807 F. Supp. 2d 828, 834–35 (D. Ariz. 2011) (no
First Amendment right of access to law enforcement investigation materials); Copley Press, Inc.
v. Superior Court, 141 P.3d 288, 309–10 (Cal. 2006) (no First Amendment right of access to
records of county Civil Service Commission).
131 See, e.g., Calder v. IRS, 890 F.2d 781, 784 (5th Cir. 1989) (refusing to recognize First
Amendment right of access to Internal Revenue Service documents pertaining to tax
investigation of Al Capone); Okla. Observer v. Patton, 73 F. Supp. 3d 1318, 1323–25 (W.D.
Okla. 2014) (no First Amendment right of access to executions); Sorenson v. Superior Court,
161 Cal. Rptr. 3d 794, 809–11 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (no First Amendment right of access to
involuntary commitment proceedings); Mayhew v. Wilder, 46 S.W.3d 760, 776–77 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2001) (no First Amendment right of access to state legislative meetings).
132 See McDonald, supra note 43, at 340–46 (arguing for a general First Amendment right of
access to government information).
133 The unique role of the courts within the American constitutional system is discussed in
Section II.B.4.
134 See infra notes 425–33 and accompanying text.
135 Olson, supra note 27, at 473.
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“wildly inconsistent.” 137 One judge even compared the increasing
secrecy in the courts to “kudzu,” a nearly uncontrollable creeping vine
that “blocks access to sunlight, slowly strangling fields and forests in its
wake.” 138
1.

Inconsistency and Uncertainty

Following the approach outlined in Press-Enterprise II, most courts
apply, or at least purport to apply, the Supreme Court’s “experience and
logic” test to determine whether a First Amendment right of access
applies to a particular judicial proceeding or record. When we examine
these cases closely, however, we see that the courts are not uniform in
their application of this test. Instead, judges often disagree about the
relative importance of the test’s two prongs and about whether
particular types of court proceedings and records satisfy one or both of
the prongs. Some courts, for example, rely exclusively on the experience
prong, 139 while others find a First Amendment right of access if the logic
prong is met. 140 Still other courts hold that a right of access attaches only
if both prongs are satisfied. 141
Courts also appear uncertain whether the experience and logic test
is applicable in situations that do not closely resemble the settings in
which the test arose. Although most courts recognize a First
Amendment right of access to criminal and civil trials, 142 as well as to
136 Lewis F. Weakland, Note, Confusion in the Courthouse: The Legacy of the Gannett and
Richmond Newspapers Public Right of Access Cases, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 603, 625 (1986).
137 Levine, supra note 27, at 1758.
138 Smith, supra note 26, at 180–81.
139 See infra notes 145–48 and accompanying text.
140 See infra notes 149–54 and accompanying text.
141 See infra notes 155–60 and accompanying text.
142 Following the Supreme Court’s decisions in Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspaper,
nearly all courts have held that the First Amendment requires a presumption of public access to
criminal trials. See LEE LEVINE ET AL., NEWSGATHERING AND THE LAW § 3.01[3] (4th ed. 2011).
Most courts also recognize a First Amendment right of public access to civil trials. See, e.g.,
Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988); Westmoreland v.
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733
F.2d 1059, 1067–70 (3d Cir. 1984); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165,
1178 (6th Cir. 1983); NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court, 980 P.2d 337, 358
(Cal. 1999); Barron v. Fl. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 531 So. 2d 113, 117–18 (Fl. 1988); Rapid
City Journal v. Delaney, 2011 SD 55, ¶ 17, 804 N.W.2d 388, 395; see also In re Cont’l Ill. Sec.
Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he policy reasons for granting public access to
criminal proceedings apply to civil cases as well.”); Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 801
(11th Cir. 1983) (holding right of access applies to civil trials pertaining to release or
incarceration of prisoners); Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 498 (D.
Del. 2012) (noting that “every Court of Appeals to consider the issue . . . has held that there is a
right of access to civil trials” and citing cases from Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh,
Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits), aff’d, 733 F.3d 510 (3d Cir. 2013). But see Ctr. for Nat’l Sec.
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many criminal trial-like proceedings, 143 judicial activities that do not fit
these precise molds are treated with far more variability. Indecision
about the scope of a First Amendment right of access is most acute in
cases involving public access to pre-trial civil proceedings, court
records, and administrative hearings, but even in the criminal context
some courts are reluctant to venture very far from the trial-like
proceedings at issue in the Press-Enterprise cases. 144 Given the three
decades that courts have had to work out these issues since the Supreme
Court’s Press-Enterprise decisions, it is notable that so much uncertainty
still remains about the scope of this important First Amendment right.
For many courts, whether there has been a history of public access
to a particular court proceeding is determinative of whether a First
Amendment right of access exists. For example, in situations where
public access has not been a tradition in American law—such as grand
jury 145 and settlement 146 proceedings—most courts refuse to recognize a
right of access under the First Amendment regardless of whether public
access could play a positive role in the functioning of the proceeding in
question. Showing how strong the allure of history can be, even courts
that do not rely exclusively on the experience prong often place
significant weight on whether the proceeding or court record has
historically been open to the public. When a proceeding does not have a
long history of access, courts have sought to draw analogies with

Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 935 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“[N]either this Court nor
the Supreme Court has ever indicated that it would apply the Richmond Newspapers test to
anything other than criminal judicial proceedings.”).
143 See LEVINE ET AL., supra note 142, §§ 3.01–3.02. In the criminal context, courts have
extended a First Amendment right of access to “preliminary hearings, suppression hearings,
bail and detention hearings, competency hearings, and plea hearings.” Id. § 3.01[1] (“Today,
almost all pretrial [criminal] proceedings are presumptively open.”). Even though the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and many state court rules call for open civil trials, see id. § 3.02, we
see far more variability in the application of a First Amendment right to pre-trial civil
proceedings. See id. § 3.02[2]–[5].
144 See, e.g., People v. Kelly, 921 N.E.2d 333, 358–59 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (finding no First
Amendment right of access to criminal pre-trial hearings on jury questionnaires or the State’s
other crimes evidence); Eagle-Tribune Publ’g Co. v. Clerk-Magistrate, 863 N.E.2d 517, 524–26
(Mass. 2007) (finding no First Amendment right of access to show cause hearings because they
“bear[] little resemblance to a trial”); Tacoma News, Inc. v. Cayce, 256 P.3d 1179, 1187, 1191
(Wash. 2011) (rejecting right of access to transcript and videotape of prisoner’s deposition in
criminal case taken in closed courtroom with judge present because it resembled “mere
discovery”).
145 See, e.g., United States v. Index Newspapers L.L.C., 766 F.3d 1072, 1084 (9th Cir. 2014);
In re N.Y. Times Co. to Unseal Wiretap & Search Warrant Materials, 577 F.3d 401, 410 & n.4
(2d Cir. 2009); In re Donovan, 801 F.2d 409, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
146 See, e.g., Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900, 903–04 (6th Cir.
1988); United States v. Town of Moreau, 979 F. Supp. 129, 133 (N.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d sub nom.
United States v. Glens Falls Newspapers, Inc., 160 F.3d 853 (2d Cir. 1998).
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proceedings that do have an established history of openness 147 or have
relied on the history, however short, of the specific proceeding
involved. 148
Other courts discount the importance of history in favor of
examining the logic of public access, focusing on whether public access
“plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular
process in question.” 149 In Press-Enterprise II, the Supreme Court itself
noted that several courts had held that a right of access attaches to pretrial proceedings even when those proceedings had “no historical
counterpart.” 150 Since Press-Enterprise II, courts have continued to find
a right of access in circumstances where no extensive history of access
can be demonstrated if the logic of openness supports a right of
access. 151 In Seattle Times Co. v. United States District Court, 152 for
example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
that public access to pre-trial detention hearings should not be
foreclosed simply because these proceedings do not have an “unbroken
history of public access.” 153 Reasoning that because pre-trial detention
hearings deal with issues that “are often important to a full
understanding of the way in which the judicial process and the
147 See, e.g., United States v. A.D., 28 F.3d 1353, 1358 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he detention and
delinquency proceedings called for in the Act are closely analogous to criminal
proceedings . . . .”); Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists v. Sec’y of Labor, 616 F. Supp. 569, 575 (D. Utah
1985) (analogizing administrative fact-finding proceedings to civil trials, which enjoyed long
history of openness), appeal dismissed and judgment below vacated and remanded as moot, 832
F.2d 1180 (10th Cir. 1987); Freitas v. Admin. Dir. of the Courts, 92 P.3d 993 (Haw. 2004)
(comparing Administrative Driver’s License Revocation Office proceedings to deportation
proceedings and Civil Service Commission hearings).
148 See, e.g., Index Newspapers, L.L.C., 766 F.3d at 1094–95 (holding that a right of access
attached to transcripts of confinement status hearings despite lack of evidence supporting a
history of openness); United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 837–40 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that
a right of access attached to post-trial inquiries into jury misconduct even though the practice
had only had a fourteen-year recorded history); First Amendment Coal. v. Judicial Inquiry &
Review Bd., 784 F.2d 467, 469 n.1, 472 (3d Cir. 1986) (concluding that public access must be
guided by “unique history and function” of fourteen-year-old Judicial Review Board).
149 Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
150 Id. at 10 n.3.
151 See, e.g., Simone, 14 F.3d at 840 (recognizing right of access to post-trial hearing in
criminal case even though “experience provides little guidance”); United States v. Suarez, 880
F.2d 626, 631 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding right of access to fee request forms from court-appointed
counsel despite the lack of a “tradition” of openness under a recent statute requiring such
applications); Seattle Times Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 845 F.2d 1513, 1516–17 (9th Cir. 1988)
(discounting the historical aspect of the Press-Enterprise II test and holding that a right of
access attaches to pre-trial detention hearings); United States v. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. 719, 722
(D. Mass. 1987) (“While the history of post-verdict interviews appears scant, the broad latitude
afforded the press in gathering news, especially in recent years, tends to favor accessability [sic]
in this areas as well.”).
152 845 F.2d 1513.
153 Id. at 1516 (“This history and the prevalent use of informal procedures should not
automatically foreclose a right of access.”).
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government as a whole are functioning,” the court concluded that the
same societal interests that mandated a First Amendment right of access
in Globe Newspaper apply to pre-trial detention hearings. 154
A majority of courts, however, do treat the experience and logic
test as a two-part test and require that both prongs be established before
a First Amendment right of access attaches to a particular court
proceeding or record. 155 But this does not mean that these courts agree
as to what is required to satisfy the individual prongs. In fact, it is not
unusual to see different courts come to opposite conclusions when they
apply the experience and logic test to the same or similar proceedings.
Application of the test has thus led to inconsistent results in a wide
variety of cases, including civil commitment proceedings, 156 deportation
proceedings, 157 guardianship proceedings, 158 judicial misconduct
hearings, 159 and juvenile proceedings. 160 We also see a great deal of
variability in the approaches that courts take with regard to court
records. 161 As a consequence, there is considerable variance from state
to state—and sometimes even from judge to judge—with regard to
whether many types of court proceedings and records are open to public
scrutiny.
2.

The Limits of Experience and Logic

The problems with the experience and logic test, however, run
much deeper than the idiosyncratic assessments of the history and logic
Id. at 1516–17.
See Levine, supra note 27, at 1778 n.242 (citing cases).
156 See LEVINE ET AL., supra note 142, § 3.03 (citing cases).
157 Compare Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding a First
Amendment right of access to deportation proceedings and associated records), with N. Jersey
Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding no First Amendment right of
access to deportation proceedings or records and explicitly disagreeing with Detroit Free Press).
158 Compare N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. J.B., 576 A.2d 261 (N.J. 1990) (finding a
First Amendment right of access to guardianship hearings), with Mayer v. State, 523 So. 2d
1171 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (finding no First Amendment right of access to
guardianship/custody hearings).
159 Compare Bradbury v. Idaho Judiciary Council, 28 P.3d 1006 (Idaho 2001) (finding no
First Amendment right of access to Judiciary Council proceedings), with Griffen v. Ark.
Judicial Discipline & Disability Comm’n, 247 S.W.3d 816 (Ark. 2007) (finding formal probablecause meeting of the Judicial Discipline Commission should have been open to the public
where the judge waived confidentiality and judicial discipline may be imposed, but avoiding the
First Amendment question).
160 Compare In re Application for News Media Coverage in the Matter of M.S., 662 N.Y.S.2d
207, 209 (Fam. Ct. 1997) (finding First Amendment right of access to delinquency proceeding),
with In re J. S., 438 A.2d 1125 (Vt. 1981) (affirming mandatory closure of all juvenile court
proceedings).
161 See infra notes 240–43 and accompanying text.
154
155
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of openness in particular court proceedings. The real problem is that the
experience and logic prongs focus on the wrong things when evaluating
whether public access should be required under the First Amendment.
By ignoring the role that court transparency plays in our constitutional
structure, the test turns out to be both too broad and too narrow a gauge
for determining whether a right of public access exists.
a.

Experience Is a Poor Guide for a Constitutional Right of
Access
There are several reasons that experience is a poor guide for a
constitutional right of access. First, uncertainty inevitably arises
concerning how long public access must continue for there to be a
“tradition of accessibility.” Second, and more fundamentally, it is not at
all clear why the past provision of public access should be determinative
of the First Amendment’s contemporary reach.
As the preceding Section noted, the lower courts have struggled to
come up with a consistent yardstick for evaluating whether public access
has been sufficiently longstanding to satisfy the Court’s requirement of a
tradition of accessibility. 162 This has generated confusion and frustration
for both judges and access advocates. As the prominent First
Amendment lawyer Lee Levine has lamented, the Court’s experience
prong has left lawyers who represent the media wondering: “How long
must public access exist for there to be a tradition of openness? How
widespread must a tradition of public access to a particular proceeding
be before openness is blessed by the judgment of experience?” 163
Part of the problem is due to the contrasting traditions of public
access in different courts and in various parts of the country. Although
the Supreme Court has clarified that a court should consider the history
of access “throughout the United States” when assessing the experience
prong, 164 the fact remains that public access has varied historically from
state to state. While past experience may provide a useful guidepost in
some situations, the lack of a tradition of openness should not be
determinative of whether a First Amendment right of access attaches to
a particular proceeding or record.
The idea that history should inform the analysis of when a First
Amendment right of access exists originated in Chief Justice Burger’s
plurality opinion in Richmond Newspapers, in which he concluded that
the First Amendment “prohibit[s] government from summarily closing
courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at the time
162
163
164

See supra notes 145–48 and accompanying text.
LEVINE ET AL., supra note 142, § 2.02[8].
El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147, 150 (1993).
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that Amendment was adopted.” 165 This use of tradition is
understandable. If, as Burger wrote, the First Amendment is intended to
“prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from
which members of the public may draw,” 166 then it makes sense to say
that it prevents the government from closing court proceedings that
have long been open to the public.
It does not follow, however, that the converse should be true: that
the absence of historical access forecloses a First Amendment right of
access. Under such an approach, courts can inoculate themselves from a
First Amendment right of access by consistently refusing to open their
proceedings to the public. Although tradition can be a useful
consideration in assessing the legitimacy of the government’s interests
in closure, its value is limited when determining whether a First
Amendment right of access exists in the first place. 167 As Heidi Kitrosser
notes, evaluating “access claims against the framers’ presumed views
regarding the openness of particular proceedings finds little support in
the text, history, or theory of the First Amendment.” 168 Justice Brennan,
who concurred in Richmond Newspapers and wrote for the Court in
Globe Newspaper, took pains to tie the Court’s consideration of history
to broader concerns, noting that a past history of access is “significant in
constitutional terms not only ‘because the Constitution carries the gloss
of history,’ but also because ‘a tradition of accessibility implies the
favorable judgment of experience.’” 169
The history of public access to a particular proceeding or record
should be relevant, if at all, because it informs the analysis of whether
public access advances constitutional values. In other words, history can
aid a court’s consideration of the benefits of access, but it does not
substitute for it. Just because a court proceeding has been open in the
past does not mean that that the First Amendment should require that it
remain open; similarly, a lack of historical access should not preclude
the recognition of a right of access in the future. As Judge Kimba Wood
has observed:

Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980).
Id. at 576 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)).
167 The Supreme Court’s inconsistent use of history in interpreting the scope of First
Amendment rights has been criticized in other contexts as well. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, The
Government Brand, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1195, 1210 (2016) (“If the Court consistently relied on
history, it would be forced to roll back protections it has extended for all sorts of speech that
were traditionally unprotected (or at least not clearly protected), and perhaps extend
protections to speech that the Court has excluded, such as obscenity.”).
168 Kitrosser, supra note 27, at 114.
169 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605 (1982) (quoting Richmond
Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
165
166
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[I]f the reasons why things were the way they were then have largely
disappeared, or if new aspects of an old proceeding have changed
that proceeding’s nature, then we do not really have the judgment of
experience—because that which experience judged no longer exists.
In other words, things developed the way they did for particular
reasons, and took into account the circumstances that existed and the
values that were important back then; unless we also examine
whether our circumstances and our values should prompt us to
maintain the tradition, we risk making the wrong decisions on access
and of erring either on the side of openness or of closure. 170

When we make history determinative of future rights of access, we
lock in a static set of practices that may have little to do with the First
Amendment justification for public access in the first place. Indeed, it
makes little sense to utilize a test that says that the public’s right of
access to the courts is limited to what the public could observe in 1789
or even 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. The fact is,
our judicial system is constantly evolving. Take criminal law as an
example. Criminal cases are increasingly resolved without any pre-trial
appearances by a defendant, let alone a full blown jury trial; today, most
criminal cases go straight from indictment to plea, with no suppression
hearing, no presentation of evidence, and no examination of
witnesses. 171
b. The Logic Prong Is Focused on the Wrong Things
Although some judges and commentators have called for
jettisoning the experience prong, 172 it would be a pyrrhic victory for
170 Kimba M. Wood, Reexamining the Access Doctrine, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1105, 1109 (1996).
Oliver Wendell Holmes made a similar point when he famously wrote that “[i]t is revolting to
have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.”
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897). Holmes
went on to remark that “[i]t is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down
have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.” Id.
171 See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2463, 2466 n.9 (2004) (“In fiscal year 2000, of 69,283 criminal cases disposed of in federal
district court by trial or plea (thus excluding dismissals), 64,939 (93.7%) were disposed of by
pleas of guilty or nolo contendere. In 2000, of approximately 924,700 felony convictions in state
courts, about 879,200 (95%) were by guilty plea. Though it is impossible to be sure, most of
these pleas probably resulted from plea bargains.” (internal citations omitted)).
172 See, e.g., United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 363 (5th Cir. 1983) (“Because the first
amendment must be interpreted in the context of current values and conditions, the lack of an
historic tradition of open bail reduction hearings does not bar our recognizing a right of access
to such hearings.” (citations omitted)); Barber v. Shop-Rite of Englewood & Assocs., Inc., 923
A.2d 286, 292 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (concluding that the history prong “provides
little guidance”); Olson, supra note 27, at 490 (arguing that “[h]istorical tradition alone cannot
be dispositive”); Alice Cole Ortiz, Note, Our “Eternal Struggle Between Liberty and Security”: A
First Amendment Right of Access to Deportation Hearings, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 1203, 1234–37
(2003) (proposing a replacement test that looks to whether a proceeding involves liberty or

ARDIA.38.3.1 (Do Not Delete)

2017]

3/8/2017 6:33 PM

COURT TRANSPARENCY

865

clarity to rely solely on the logic prong—as it is currently understood—
to determine whether a First Amendment right of access exists. When
we examine how courts apply the logic prong, we see two related
problems that limit its efficacy as a threshold test for a right of access
under the First Amendment.
First, courts take too narrow a view of the benefits of openness,
focusing only on the role that public access plays in a particular court
proceeding and eschewing a broader structural perspective that
considers how public access advances democratic self-government.
While the Supreme Court alluded to the structural benefits of public
access in Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspaper, 173 the test it laid
out in Press-Enterprise II directs courts to assess the benefits of access to
the functioning of the specific proceeding in question. 174 As a result, the
Court’s access cases have left the lower courts confused as to which
values matter most when considering public access claims: the benefits
that public access confers on a specific proceeding; the impact that
public access has on the court system as a whole; or the structural role
that access serves by exposing the public to information necessary for
self-governance. Most courts focus on the first of these benefits with an
occasional mention of the value of openness to the overall system of
justice. Very few courts spend any time analyzing the third, and most
important, benefit of public access: the role that court transparency
plays in our constitutional system. 175
Second, because courts focus on the role that access plays in
individual court proceedings, the logic prong ends up being too
indeterminate to facilitate reasoned line drawing between proceedings
where public access would advance First Amendment values and those
in which secrecy is necessary to preserve other interests. 176 Although an
inquiry directed at assessing whether public access is important to the
functioning of a specific court proceeding has intuitive appeal, such a
narrow view of the logic of openness fails to provide useful guidance to
courts when evaluating cases where there are significant competing
interests opposing openness. For example, public access will almost
certainly enhance the perception of fairness, discourage perjury, and
reduce the influence of bias and partiality in nearly every court

property interests and whether due process rights are required); see also Michelle Kundmueller,
The Devil Is in All the Details (Not Just in Georgia), 13 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 221, 260–61
(2014) (rejecting the use of history as a determinate of constitutional rights generally).
173 See supra notes 100–06 and accompanying text.
174 Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (commanding courts to assess “whether public
access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question”).
175 See infra Section II.B.
176 See, e.g., Kitrosser, supra note 27, at 99, 115; Weakland, supra note 136, at 620–21.
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proceeding. 177 It is difficult to imagine a court proceeding in which
public access would not further its functioning to some degree. Justice
Stevens pointed this out in his dissent in Press-Enterprise II, arguing that
the Court’s logic test could require that even grand jury proceedings be
open to the public. 178
All of which is to say that although the experience and logic test
ostensibly offers a way for courts to evaluate public access claims, in
practice it leaves courts with little actual guidance in deciding difficult
cases.
3.

The Danger of Ad Hoc Balancing

Because of uncertainty about how to apply the experience and logic
test, many courts default to a form of ad hoc balancing, treating public
access as simply one of many equally important competing
considerations. Courts that engage in such balancing subvert the
Supreme Court’s two-step approach to evaluating access claims. Under
the framework laid out in Globe Newspaper and further refined in the
Press-Enterprise cases, courts are first charged with determining whether
a right of access exists under the First Amendment by examining
whether there has a been a history of public access and whether public
access would play a significant positive role in the functioning of the
process in question. 179 If this threshold test is met, a right of access
attaches and the proceeding is presumptively open to the public unless
closure is necessary to serve a compelling interest, and is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest. 180
Rather than apply this two-step inquiry, which makes the benefits
of public access a primary consideration in whether a First Amendment
right of access attaches to the proceeding in question, some courts
simply evaluate all of the competing interests at once. 181 In doing so,
177 See, e.g., United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 556 (3d Cir. 1982) (identifying “at least six
societal interests” advanced by public access and finding that these interests supported a First
Amendment right of access to pre-trial suppression, due process, and entrapment hearings).
178 Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 25–26 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens warned: “[T]here
are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by ingenious argument in the garb of
decreased data flow.” Id. at 28 (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,
588 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
179 See supra notes 114–18 and accompanying text.
180 The Supreme Court has used slightly different wording for evaluating the state’s interests
supporting closure, but the test basically matches the Court’s strict scrutiny test as applied in
other First Amendment contexts. See infra notes 436–41 and accompanying text.
181 See, e.g., Times Mirror Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he
public has no right of access to a particular proceeding without first establishing that the
benefits of opening the proceedings outweigh the costs to the public.”); Cincinnati Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900, 904 (6th Cir. 1988) (balancing interest in closure against
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they discount the benefits of access and overweigh the interests in
closure. Whereas the Supreme Court’s two-step approach requires that
the interests supporting closure be compelling, courts that engage in ad
hoc balancing can avoid this high standard for closure if they conclude
at the threshold that on balance public access does not play a significant
positive role in the proceeding. For many courts, their analysis ends
with just such a balancing of interests, which is increasingly becoming
the de facto test for a First Amendment right of access. 182
A simple balancing test for access is especially appealing to judges
because it offers greater flexibility than the more stringent requirements
outlined in Globe Newspaper and the Press-Enterprise cases. 183 In fact,
this was the approach put forth by Justice Stevens in his dissent in PressEnterprise II. 184 Yet the Court has been reluctant to adopt ad hoc
balancing in First Amendment cases because such tests are highly
subjective and open ended. 185 Furthermore, balancing tests cannot
account for the presumption of public access the First Amendment
requires. A majority of the Court rejected this approach in PressEnterprise II, preferring to apply a threshold test focused on the benefits
of openness followed by an assessment of whether the interests
supporting closure are compelling. 186
Two circuit court decisions in cases involving public access to
deportation proceedings illustrate the problems that invariably follow
when courts engage in ad hoc balancing under the logic prong. In
limitation of First Amendment freedom as a substitute for an assessment of whether access
plays a positive role in the functioning of summary jury trials); Crowe v. Cty. of San Diego, 210
F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1197 (S.D. Cal. 2002) (balancing fair trial concerns against the value of access
as part of the logic prong); B.H. v. Ryder, 856 F. Supp. 1285, 1290 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (considering
a number of logistical complications in opening the particular conferences in question and
failing to articulate whether a right attached in the first place). Some courts skip any analysis of
the benefits of access and go straight to the disadvantages. See, e.g., Ky. Press Ass’n v. Kentucky,
355 F. Supp. 2d 853, 864 (E.D. Ky. 2005) (considering only the drawbacks of public access to
juvenile delinquency proceedings and concluding that “opening juvenile proceedings would
frustrate the purpose of juvenile court” by “depriv[ing] the juvenile of a fair trial” and
“diminish[ing] . . . [the] prospect for rehabilitation”).
182 As Raleigh Hannah Levine notes, courts that apply this “atypical logic prong
analysis . . . consistently . . . find[] that the proceeding fails the logic prong and that no access
right attaches.” Levine, supra note 27, at 1743.
183 See, e.g., Michael J. Hayes, Note, What Ever Happened to ‘The Right to Know’?: Access to
Government-Controlled Information Since Richmond Newspapers, 73 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1137
(1987) (noting the flexibility offered by a balancing test).
184 Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 28–29 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
185 See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470–71 (2010) (“The Government thus
proposes that . . . ‘[w]hether a given category of speech enjoys First Amendment protection
depends upon a categorical balancing of the value of the speech against its societal costs.’ As a
free-floating test for First Amendment coverage, that sentence is startling and dangerous. The
First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not extend only to categories of speech that
survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits.” (citations omitted)).
186 Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 7–9.
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Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 187 members of the press and public
brought actions against the U.S. Attorney General seeking a declaration
that the closure of “special interest” deportation proceedings after the
attacks on September 11, 2001 violated their First Amendment right of
access. 188 The Sixth Circuit began its analysis of the plaintiffs’ First
Amendment claim by concluding that the case would be governed by
the experience and logic test, rejecting the government’s argument that
the test is inapplicable to deportation proceedings. 189 As to the first
prong of the test, the court found that a wealth of evidence supported
the conclusion that deportation proceedings historically have been
open. 190
Turning to the logic prong, the Sixth Circuit concluded that
“[p]ublic access undoubtedly enhances the quality of deportation
proceedings.” 191 According to the court, “public access acts as a check
on the actions of the Executive by assuring us that proceedings are
conducted fairly and properly”; “openness ensures that government
does its job properly [and] that it does not make mistakes”; and, “after
the devastation of September 11 and the massive investigation that
followed,” open deportation proceedings “serve a ‘therapeutic’ purpose
as outlets for ‘community concern, hostility, and emotions.’” 192 Quoting
Justice Brennan’s opinion in Globe Newspaper, the Sixth Circuit also
remarked that public access to deportation proceedings “helps ensure
that ‘the individual citizen can effectively participate in and contribute
to our republican system of self-government.’” 193 As to this latter
benefit, the court went on to observe:

303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 682–83. On September 21, 2001, Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy issued a
directive to all United States Immigration Judges requiring closure of “special interest” cases.
Id. at 683. The directive required that “all proceedings in such cases be closed to the press and
public, including family members and friends.” Id. at 684.
189 Id. at 695. According to the court, the experience and logic test is not limited solely to
criminal proceedings and other courts have properly applied the test to administrative
proceedings. Id. (citing United States v. Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 797, 824 (6th Cir. 2002)
(university’s student disciplinary board proceedings); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v.
FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1177–79 (6th Cir. 1983) (civil action against administrative agency);
Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984) (civil trial); Whiteland Woods,
L.P. v. Twp. of W. Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 1999) (municipal planning meeting);
Cal–Almond, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 960 F.2d 105, 109 (9th Cir. 1992) (agriculture
department’s voters list); Soc’y of Prof. Journalists v. Sec’y of Labor, 616 F. Supp. 569, 574 (D.
Utah 1985) (administrative hearing), vacated as moot, 832 F.2d 1180 (10th Cir. 1987)).
190 Id. at 701–03 (noting that the first general immigration act was enacted in 1882; the
tradition had been to conduct open deportation proceedings, and deportation proceedings have
been presumptively open to the public by statute since 1965).
191 Id. at 703.
192 Id. at 703–04 (quoting Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980)).
193 Id. at 704 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982)).
187
188
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“[A] major purpose of [the First Amendment] was to protect the free
discussion of governmental affairs.” Public access to deportation
proceedings helps inform the public of the affairs of the government.
Direct knowledge of how their government is operating enhances the
public’s ability to affirm or protest government’s efforts. When
government selectively chooses what information it allows the public
to see, it can become a powerful tool for deception. 194

Having found a First Amendment right of access to deportation
hearings, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the closure of all “special
interest” deportation proceedings, while justified by a compelling
interest in national security, 195 was not “narrowly tailored to serve that
interest.” 196 According to the court, the government’s wholesale closure
of these deportation proceedings was over-inclusive and
indiscriminate. 197 If a hearing will disclose information that is likely to
harm national security, that information “could be kept from the public
on a case-by-case basis through protective orders or in camera
review.”198
Following closely on the heels of the Sixth Circuit’s decision in
Detroit Free Press, the Third Circuit considered a nearly identical set of
facts in North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft (NJMG). 199 In NJMG,
a consortium of media organizations also sought access to “special
interest” deportation hearings. 200 Just as the Sixth Circuit had done, the
Third Circuit concluded that the case was governed by the experience
and logic test, but it came to the opposite conclusion regarding whether
the test was satisfied. 201 Whereas the Sixth Circuit had found ample
evidence that deportation proceedings have historically been open to the
public, 202 the Third Circuit concluded that the hearings failed the
experience prong. 203 Applying an exceedingly high standard for
evaluating a history of access, the Third Circuit concluded that while
deportation hearings have been presumptively open since at least 1964,
when federal regulations began to provide explicitly for public access, “a

194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203

Id. at 704–05 (alterations in original) (quoting Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604).
Id. at 707.
Id. at 705 (quoting Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606–07).
Id. at 708.
Id.
308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002).
Id. at 199.
Id. at 204–05.
See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
NJMG, 308 F.3d at 214–15.
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recent—and rebuttable—regulatory presumption is hardly the stuff of
which Constitutional rights are forged.” 204
Although the Third Circuit found that a lack of a history of access
to deportation proceedings was enough to doom the petitioners’ First
Amendment access claim, 205 the court went on to consider whether the
logic prong was satisfied. It is in the Third Circuit’s analysis of the logic
prong that we see the depth of the problem with the way many courts
approach the logic of openness. Instead of considering the interests
supporting secrecy in its analysis of whether the closure of the
proceedings survived strict scrutiny, the Third Circuit concluded that
the arguments for closure “are equally applicable to the question
whether openness, on balance, serves a positive role in removal
hearings.” 206 Acknowledging that such an approach would result in
“overlap between the Richmond Newspapers logic prong and the
subsequent ‘compelling government interest’ strict scrutiny
investigation necessary upon a finding of a First Amendment access
right,” the court reasoned that this double counting was proper because
it “would simply require that the policy rationales supporting openness
be even more compelling than those supporting closure.” 207
By requiring that the rationales supporting openness must be more
compelling than the interests supporting closure, the Third Circuit
turned the right of public access on its head. Under Richmond
Newspapers and its progeny, the courts are presumed to be open to the
public. 208 Accordingly, public access is the default unless countervailing
interests justify closure. Yet under the Third Circuit’s approach, courts
are to start with the presumption that court proceedings are closed and
must remain so unless the benefits of public access are more compelling
than the interests supporting closure. 209 By flipping the presumption of
access, the Third Circuit has stacked the deck in favor of closure.
But the Third Circuit’s approach is even more pernicious because
of the way the court went about evaluating the relevant interests. In
assessing whether “openness, on balance, serves a positive role in
removal hearings,” 210 the Third Circuit did not consider the positive and
204 Id. at 213. The Third Circuit also rejected the argument that despite “undeniable
similarities” between deportation proceedings and criminal and civil trials, the case law did not
support a right of public access to deportation proceedings. Id. at 214–15.
205 Id. at 215–16.
206 Id. at 217.
207 Id. at 217 n.13.
208 See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 610 (1982); Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980) (plurality opinion).
209 See NJMG, 308 F.3d at 217 n.13 (conceding that the court’s approach “require[s] that the
policy rationales supporting openness be even more compelling than those supporting
closure”).
210 Id. at 217.
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negative aspects of open deportation hearings generally. Instead, it
weighed the benefits of public access to deportation proceedings as a
general matter against the negative impacts of public access solely in the
“special interest” cases singled out for closure by the government. 211 In
other words, the Third Circuit evaluated whether any deportation
hearings should be open by focusing only on cases where the interests in
closure were strongest. As Heidi Kitrosser observes, the Third Circuit’s
application of the logic prong “takes analysis designed to determine
whether special factors overcome a general access presumption in
particular cases and uses such analysis to determine whether a general
access right exists in the first place.” 212 Judge Scirica made this very
point in his dissent, arguing that while closure might be warranted in
specific cases, “the demands of national security under the logic prong
of Richmond Newspapers do not provide sufficient justification for
rejecting a qualified right of access to deportation hearings in
general.” 213 “To conclude otherwise,” he warned, “would permit
concerns relevant only to a discrete class of cases to determine there is
no qualified right of access to any of the broad range of deportation
proceedings.” 214 This is, of course, precisely what the majority did under
the logic prong in NJMG.
As the preceding discussion shows, there are deep flaws in the
experience and logic test which have led courts to engage in ad hoc
balancing to determine whether a First Amendment right of access
exists. To be sure, some evaluation of the reasons why closure would be
beneficial must be undertaken when considering the logic of public
access, but even if public access has a negative impact on a particular
proceeding, that does not necessarily mean that the interests in closure
outweigh the advantages that public access provides in all hearings of
that type.
4.

Common-Law Access and the Dilemma of Court Records

As in many areas of First Amendment law, how a court decides the
threshold question of whether a First Amendment right is implicated
will largely determine whether public access is required at all. Although
most courts acknowledge that the public can also have a common-law
211 Judge Scirica noted this problem in his dissent: “At [the experience and logic test] stage,
we must consider the value of openness in deportation hearings generally, not its benefits and
detriments in ‘special interest’ deportation hearings in particular.” Id. at 225 (Scirica, J.,
dissenting).
212 Kitrosser, supra note 27, at 125.
213 NJMG, 308 F.3d at 225 (Scirica, J., dissenting).
214 Id.
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right of access to court proceedings and their associated records, 215 there
is an enormous difference between the standard a judge must employ
when considering common-law access claims compared to claims
premised on the First Amendment. Whereas the First Amendment
requires that restrictions on access must be necessary to serve a
compelling interest and be narrowly tailored to serve that interest, 216 a
judge need only find under the common law that the interests in closure
outweigh the interests in access. 217 Moreover, when there is no First
Amendment right of access, judges who impose restrictions on public
access are granted broad deference by reviewing courts and are typically
subject only to an “abuse of discretion” standard when they restrict
access. 218
Most of the case law regarding a common-law right of access to the
courts has arisen in the context of disputes over court records and
dockets. 219 The Supreme Court’s only pronouncement on a commonlaw right of access to the courts came in Nixon v. Warner
Communications, Inc., 220 which preceded by two years the Court’s
decision in Richmond Newspapers, recognizing a First Amendment right
of access to criminal trials. 221 In Nixon, the press sought access to tape
recordings that had been introduced as evidence at the trial of several of
215 See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) (recognizing a
federal common law “right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including
judicial records and documents” (footnote omitted)).
216 See, e.g., Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1986); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982).
217 See, e.g., Nixon, 435 U.S. at 602; United States v. Graham, 257 F.3d 143, 153–55 (2d Cir.
2001); United States v. Beckham, 789 F.2d 401, 409–10 (6th Cir. 1986). Moreover, unlike a First
Amendment right of access, a common law right can be supplanted by statute. See, e.g., Ctr. for
Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 936 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“[T]he common
law right of access is preempted by FOIA.”).
218 See, e.g., United States v. McDougal, 103 F.3d 651, 657 (8th Cir. 1996); Belo Broad. Corp.
v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 430 (5th Cir. 1981). There is some disagreement among the federal
courts of appeal as to whether they should apply a more searching review than abuse of
discretion. See Graham, 257 F.3d at 148–49 (discussing the disagreement among the circuits but
deciding that it could leave the decision to another day because the panel would affirm the
district court’s decision under either an abuse of discretion standard or a more stringent
standard); Beckham, 789 F.2d at 412–13 (applying more searching review); United States v.
Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 818 (3d Cir. 1981) (same).
219 See Joe Regalia, The Common Law Right to Information, 18 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 89,
101–03 (2015). Indeed, there are only a few cases delineating the common-law right of access to
court proceedings. See, e.g., Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 933 F. Supp. 647, 650 (S.D. Tex.
1996) (“[T]he right of the public to attend civil trials is grounded in the First Amendment as
well as the common law.”); Sentinel Star Co. v. Edwards, 387 So. 2d 367, 374 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980) (“The press and public had a common law right of access to the hearing.”); In re
Conservatorship of Brownstone, 594 N.Y.S.2d 31, 32 (App. Div. 1993) (“The statutory and
common law of this State have long recognized that civil actions and proceedings should be
open to the public in order to ensure that they are conducted efficiently, honestly, and fairly.”).
220 435 U.S. 589.
221 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion).
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President Nixon’s former advisors on charges of conspiring to obstruct
justice in connection with the Watergate investigation. 222 Although the
trial court made transcripts of the recordings available, the press argued
that the public should be able to hear the actual conversations, replete
with nuance and inflection. 223
As discussed in Section I.A, the Supreme Court rejected the
argument that the First Amendment mandated disclosure of the
tapes. 224 Nevertheless, the Court did conclude that the common-law
right to “inspect and copy public records and documents, including
judicial records and documents,” extended to the tapes. 225 The Court
emphasized, however, that this common-law right was not absolute.
According to the Court, “[e]very court has supervisory power over its
own records and files” and, even when a common-law right of access
exists, a court can deny access to its files when they “might . . . become a
vehicle for improper purposes.” 226 Although the Court conceded that
the balance of interests was close, it found that the Presidential
Recordings Act, which provides an administrative procedure for the
press to seek release of the tapes, tipped the scale against ordering their
disclosure from the trial court’s files. 227 The Court also remarked that
the public had a chance to listen to the contents of the tapes at the time
they were played in open court and requiring release of the physical
copies would raise the “danger that the court could become a partner in
the use of the subpoenaed material ‘to gratify private spite or promote
public scandal,’ with no corresponding assurance of public benefit.”228
By focusing on the public availability of the transcripts, the Court
sidestepped the question of whether the First Amendment provided a
right of access to the tapes. 229 Because the tapes had already been played

Nixon, 435 U.S. at 592–94.
Id. at 600.
224 See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text.
225 Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597 (footnote omitted).
226 Id. at 598.
227 Id. at 600–02. President Nixon, who argued against making the tapes available, asserted a
property interest in the tapes, a right to privacy, and executive privilege. Id. He also highlighted
the “unseemliness” of a court facilitating the commercialization of the tapes. Id. at 602. “On
respondents’ side of the scales,” the Court noted, “is the incremental gain in public
understanding of an immensely important historical occurrence that arguably would flow from
the release of aural copies of these tapes, a gain said to be not inconsequential despite the
already widespread dissemination of printed transcripts.” Id.
228 Id. at 603 (quoting In re Caswell, 29 A. 259, 259 (1893)). The Court also noted that the
proper method for seeking physical copies of the tapes was through the Presidential Recordings
Act. Id.
229 See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 609. According to the Court,
222
223

the press—including reporters of the electronic media—was permitted to listen to the
tapes and report on what was heard. Reporters also were furnished transcripts of the
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in open court, the Court determined that “[t]here is no question of a
truncated flow of information to the public.” 230 The only issue the Court
saw with regard to the First Amendment was whether “copies of the
White House tapes—to which the public has never had physical access—
must be made available for copying.” 231 Seeing this as a case about
special access for the press, the Court held that “[t]he First Amendment
generally grants the press no right to information about a trial superior
to that of the general public,” which could have listened to the tapes in
the courtroom. 232 In framing the issue as it did, however, the Court left
open the possibility that the First Amendment might have been
implicated if the trial court had refused to provide any public access to
the contents of the tapes. 233
The Court’s decision eight years later in Press-Enterprise II could
have settled the question of whether a First Amendment right of access
extends to trial exhibits and other judicial records, 234 but the Court
inexplicably failed to do so. In Press-Enterprise II, a magistrate judge
excluded the press and public from a forty-one day preliminary hearing
in a murder case. 235 At the conclusion of the closed hearing, the judge
refused to release the transcript and sealed the hearing record. 236 As
discussed in greater detail in Section I.A, the Supreme Court applied the
experience and logic test to the hearing in question and concluded that
it satisfied both prongs of the test for a First Amendment right of
access. 237 Rather confusingly, however, the Court analyzed the logic of
openness by discussing access to both the preliminary hearing and to
the transcript of the hearing as if they were indistinguishable for
purposes of satisfying the public’s right of access under the First

tapes, which they were free to comment upon and publish. The contents of the tapes
were given wide publicity by all elements of the media.
Id.

230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237

Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text.
Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 13.
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Amendment, 238 yet the Court’s statement of its holding mentions only a
First Amendment right of access to the preliminary hearing itself. 239
Perhaps not surprisingly, the Court’s analysis in Press-Enterprise II
left the lower courts uncertain as to whether the First Amendment right
of access recognized in Richmond Newspapers, Globe Newspaper, and
the Press-Enterprise cases extends to judicial records. A review of the
many cases involving public access claims to court records reveals that
the courts have largely taken one of three approaches to the question of
public access: some courts bypass a First Amendment inquiry and
simply apply a common-law test for access; 240 other courts analyze
whether a First Amendment right applies to the record in question by
examining whether the judicial proceeding that the record is associated
with passes the experience and logic test; 241 and still other courts apply
the experience and logic test to the court record itself. 242 In fact, several
federal circuits cannot seem to make up their minds and apply more
than one approach. 243
Because of these divergent approaches to resolving disputes over
public access, it is possible that a court proceeding could be subject to a
First Amendment right of access—with the attendant requirement that
closure must pass strict scrutiny and survive narrow tailoring—but the
documents associated with that proceeding are subject only to a
common-law right that leaves their fate to the discretion of the trial
238 Compare id. at 12–13 (“[T]he absence of a jury, long recognized as ‘an inestimable
safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the complaint, biased, or
eccentric judge,’ makes the importance of public access to a preliminary hearing even more
significant.” (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968))), with id. at 13 (“Denying
the transcript of a 41-day preliminary hearing would frustrate what we have characterized as
the ‘community therapeutic value’ of openness.” (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 570 (1980) (plurality opinion))).
239 Id. (“We therefore conclude that the qualified First Amendment right of access to
criminal proceedings applies to preliminary hearings as they are conducted in California.”).
240 See, e.g., United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v.
Webbe, 791 F.2d 103, 106 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Edwards, 672 F.2d 1289, 1294 (7th
Cir. 1982); Howard v. State, 291 P.3d 137, 142 (Nev. 2012).
241 See, e.g., United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1359–60 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v.
Haller, 837 F.2d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 1988); In re Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., 828 F.2d 340, 342–44 (6th
Cir. 1987); In re Wash. Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 389–90 (4th Cir. 1986).
242 See, e.g., Wash. Post v. Robinson, 935 F.2d 282, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Oregonian Publ’g
Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 920 F.2d 1462, 1466 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d
224, 229 (7th Cir. 1989); In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Gunn, 855
F.2d 569, 573 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104, 1111–12 (3d Cir. 1985);
Associated Press v. U.S. Dist. Court, 705 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1983).
243 Compare Antar, 38 F.3d at 1359–60 (applying experience and logic test to court records),
with Smith, 776 F.2d at 1111–12 (applying experience and logic test to proceeding associated
with records); Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 92–96 (2d Cir. 2004) (applying
experience and logic test to court dockets), with In re N.Y. Times Co., 828 F.2d 110, 114 (2d
Cir. 1987) (applying experience and logic test to proceeding associated with records).
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court. 244 Of course, the converse situation can occur as well in which
there is a First Amendment right of access to the documents but not to
the proceeding itself. 245 This can lead to some anomalous results where
the public has only partial access to the workings of the courts. 246
Returning to our earlier criticism of the Supreme Court’s
experience and logic test, we can see that the test is particularly ill suited
to dealing with public access claims directed at court records. Court
records may not share the same history of public access as court
proceedings and, as to the logic of public access, the interests implicated
by public access to court proceedings and their associated records may
be quite different. In fact, the test may point in opposite directions. For
example, even when a court proceeding has traditionally been closed to
the public, there may still be a history of public access to the transcript
of the proceeding. 247 Similarly, under the logic prong, allowing public
access to a court proceeding might affect its functioning, but with the
244 See, e.g., Corbitt, 879 F.2d at 228–29 (finding only a common-law right of access to pretrial sentence reports despite First Amendment right of access to the proceedings); United
States v. Gotti, 322 F. Supp. 2d 230, 249–50 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (recognizing First Amendment
right of access to sentencing hearing but finding no right of access to presentence letters sent
directly to the court); Times Herald Printing Co. v. Jones, 717 S.W.2d 933, 938–39 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1986) (noting that even if a First Amendment right of access applies to civil trials, the
“limited” common-law access right to the judicial records meant that the records could be
sealed at the court’s discretion), vacated for lack of jurisdiction, 730 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. 1987).
245 See, e.g., Gunn, 855 F.2d at 573 (finding no First Amendment right of access to search
warrant proceedings but nevertheless determining that a First Amendment right attaches to
documents filed in support of search warrants); Edwards, 823 F.2d at 117–19 (finding no First
Amendment right of access to mid-trial questioning of jurors regarding potential misconduct,
but holding that a right of access attached to the transcript of the hearing); United States v.
Koubriti, 252 F. Supp. 2d 424, 436 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (holding that closure of voir dire in
terrorism trial did not violate First Amendment right of access so long as transcript was
released).
246 See Antar, 38 F.3d at 1360 (“It would be an odd result indeed were we to declare that our
courtrooms must be open, but that transcripts of the proceedings occurring there may be
closed, for what exists of the right of access if it extends only to those who can squeeze through
the door?”); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski, 868 F.2d 497, 504 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding First
Amendment right of access to criminal court records and stating, “[i]f the press is to fulfill its
function of surrogate, it surely cannot be restricted to report on only those judicial proceedings
that it has sufficient personnel to cover contemporaneously”). But see United States v.
McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 812 (10th Cir. 1997) (“There is not yet any definitive Supreme Court
ruling on whether there is a constitutional right [in addition to the common-law right] of
access to court documents and, if so, the scope of such a right.”).
247 See, e.g., United States v. A.D., 28 F.3d 1353, 1362 n.8 (3d Cir. 1994) (“There well may be
situations in which a proper weighing of the public’s interest and the interests of the juvenile
will call for a denial of access to a hearing and nevertheless require access at a later point to the
transcript of that hearing.”); Edwards, 823 F.2d at 116–18 (“We conclude that the first
amendment guarantees a limited right of access to the record of closed proceedings concerning
potential jury misconduct and raises a presumption that the transcript of such proceedings will
be released within a reasonable time.”); Alvarez v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 854, 864–65
(Ct. App. 2007) (applying California statute that required closure of grand jury proceedings but
granted public access to post-indictment grand jury transcripts).
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passage of time those concerns may dissipate and, thus, access to the
transcript or other records would not necessarily have the same effect
on the logic of openness. 248
Given the confusion in the lower courts about the experience and
logic test’s applicability and appropriate application to court records,
many courts disregard the two-part test just as we saw in the context of
court proceedings, and either engage in an outright balancing of
interests, 249 or ignore the First Amendment completely and apply the
common-law test for access. 250
Although the common-law test does force judges to start with a
presumption of public access, it grants them too much discretion to
restrict access. As others have observed, “[t]here are virtually no clear
standards [under the common law] guiding the court’s decision, and the
determination is inherently fact-based.”251 Remarking on the
discretionary nature of the common-law balancing test, the Supreme
Court wrote in Nixon:
It is difficult to distill from the relatively few judicial decisions a
comprehensive definition of what is referred to as the common-law
right of access or to identify all the factors to be weighed in
determining whether access is appropriate. . . . [T]he decision as to
access is one best left to the sound discretion of the trial court, a

248 See, e.g., B.H. v. McDonald, 49 F.3d 294, 301 (7th Cir. 1995) (“We do not hereby deny the
public a right of access to information about the in-chambers hearings; rather, we hold only
that the public has no right to follow the negotiators into the negotiation room. . . . Moreover,
as we noted supra, the public will have access to records of the in-chambers conferences
[afterwards].”).
249 See, e.g., Wendt v. Wendt, 706 A.2d 1021, 1023 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1996) (stating that a
First Amendment right of access to court records exists, but explicitly applying a balancing test
to determine if sealing was permissible); Mancheski v. Gabelli Grp. Capital Partners, 835
N.Y.S.2d 595, 598 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing First Amendment right of access, but
concluding that the court’s “task involves weighing the interests of the public against the
interests of the parties”).
250 See, e.g., In re Application of Newsday, Inc., 895 F.2d 74, 78–79 (2d Cir. 1990); In re
Application of Kan. City Star Co., 143 F.R.D. 223, 227 (W.D. Mo. 1992); Ashworth v. Bagley,
351 F. Supp. 2d 786, 789 (S.D. Ohio 2005).
251 Regalia, supra note 219, at 103; see also Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589,
599 (1978) (“[T]he decision as to access is one best left to the sound discretion of the trial court,
a discretion to be exercised in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular
case.”); United States v. Webbe, 791 F.2d 103, 107 (8th Cir. 1986) (“[W]e think the decision as
to [common-law] access is properly handled on an ad hoc basis by the district judge, who is in
the best position to recognize and weigh the appropriate factors on both sides of the issue.”);
United States v. Rosenthal, 763 F.2d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 1985) (“The proper balancing of the
foregoing factors is a matter which is vested in the first instance in the sound discretion of the
trial court.”); United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 817 (3d Cir. 1981) (“[A]ll parties agree that
release of the tapes is a matter committed to the discretion of the trial court . . . .”); Belo Broad.
Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 430–31 (5th Cir. 1981) (“Only an egregious abuse of discretion
should merit reversal.” (quoting Nixon, 435 U.S. at 614 (Stevens, J., dissenting))).
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discretion to be exercised in light of the relevant facts and
circumstances of the particular case. 252

In practice, the common law’s reliance on the discretion of trial
courts results in far too many closure orders. Take the case that opened
the introduction to this Article, Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc. 253 In
a lawsuit involving a discrimination claim under the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, the trial court imposed what can only be described
as extreme measures to prevent public access to the case: the court
allowed the plaintiff to proceed pseudonymously, closed all court
proceedings, sealed all judicial records, and sealed the case docket. 254
When the defendant appealed the wholesale sealing and closure of the
case, the Third Circuit devoted a single paragraph to the issue, stating:
“[W]e review the grant or modification of a confidentiality order for an
abuse of discretion. There was no abuse of discretion. The record fully
supports the District Court’s order.” 255 Presumably, the Third Circuit
concluded that there was no reason to even consider whether the public
had a First Amendment right to access any aspect of this case, including
the summary judgment proceedings, their associated records, and the
district court’s summary judgment decision. 256 But we do not know
because neither the district court nor the Third Circuit issued any public
findings to support the closure of this case. The two perfunctory
sentences at the end of the Third Circuit’s opinion provide the only
public discussion of the issue. Even under the highly deferential
common-law right of access, the question of public access deserves more
analysis than this.
Unfortunately, Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc. is not unique.
In jurisdictions all across the country, trial courts maintain secret
dockets containing thousands of cases, “often [on] mundane legal
matters involving the rich and politically powerful.” 257 For example,
Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598–99.
527 F.3d 358 (3d Cir.), order clarified, 543 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 2008).
254 See supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text.
255 C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d at 371 (citing Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d
772, 783 (3d Cir. 1994)). The defendant also challenged the plaintiff’s use of a pseudonym. The
Third Circuit spent little time disposing of this issue as well, noting in a footnote:
252
253

Although we have yet to address the issue, the decision whether to allow a plaintiff to
proceed anonymously rests within the sound discretion of the court. After a careful
review of all the circumstances of this case (including the District Court’s thorough
hearing), we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in granting Doe’s motion
to proceed anonymously.
Id. at 371 n.2 (citations omitted).
256 It is not possible to know what proceedings took place in the district court and what
records were in the case file because the district court sealed the case docket, as well.
257 Brief Amici Curiae of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and TwentyNine Media Organizations in Support of Petitioners at 11, N.Y. Law Publ’g Co. v. Doe, 555 U.S.
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following the Second Circuit’s decision in Hartford Courant Co. v.
Pellegrino invalidating the state’s practices on First Amendment
grounds, 258 the State of Connecticut unsealed more than 10,000 cases on
its secret docket, most of which “comprised divorce or family law
matters involving state officials, judges, prominent attorneys, corporate
officers, and celebrities.”259 Even within the federal system, there are
thousands of cases that are being adjudicated in secret, although it is
impossible to know how many. A survey by the Reporters Committee
for Freedom of the Press (RCFP) “found that most district courts
surveyed admitted to having secret civil cases pending.” 260 Although
many district courts would not say how many cases they had, the RCFP
reported that “[a]s of June 2003, the Middle District of Georgia had 33
secret civil cases pending, the Northern District of Florida had seven
secret civil cases pending, the Western District of Arkansas and the
Eastern District of Wisconsin each had two secret civil cases
pending.”261
As with C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc., we often hear about these
cases only when an appellate court issues a public decision addressing
some aspect of the case. In a lawsuit that bears shockingly similar
procedural facts to C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc., the Fourth Circuit
reversed a district court’s sealing of the entire record in Doe v. Public
Citizen and stated:
By sealing the entire docket sheet during the pendency of the
litigation, as the district court permitted in this case, courts
effectively shut out the public and the press from exercising their
constitutional and common-law right of access to civil proceedings.
But there is a more repugnant aspect to depriving the public and
press access to docket sheets: no one can challenge closure of a
document or proceeding that is itself a secret. . . . Because access to
docket sheets is integral to providing meaningful access to civil
proceedings, we hold that the public and press enjoy a presumptive
right to inspect docket sheets in civil cases under the First
Amendment. 262

1013 (2008) (No. 08-330), 2008 WL 4618213, at *11 [hereinafter Amicus Brief in Support of
Petitioners].
258 Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 85–86 (2d Cir. 2004).
259 Meliah Thomas, Comment, The First Amendment Right of Access to Docket Sheets, 94
CALIF. L. REV. 1537, 1552 (2006).
260 Rory Eastburg, Nothing to See Here, NEWS MEDIA & L., Winter 2009, at 34.
261 Amicus Brief in Support of Petitioners, supra note 257, at 12 (quoting SARA THACKER,
REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, SECRET JUSTICE: SECRET DOCKETS 5 (2003),
http://www.rcfp.org/rcfp/orders/docs/SJDOCKETS.pdf).
262 Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 268–69 (4th Cir. 2014); see also United States v.
Valenti, 987 F.2d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that secret dockets are “inconsistent with
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Cases like Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc. and Doe v. Public
Citizen lead one to wonder how it is possible that more than thirty years
after the Supreme Court remarked in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia that “[i]n guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech and
press, the First Amendment can be read as protecting the right of
everyone to attend trials so as to give meaning to those explicit
guarantees,”263 so many courts continue to reject the proposition that
the public has a constitutional right to observe the activities of the
courts. Clearly, the message from Richmond Newspapers has not been
fully received.
The Supreme Court’s conditional, ad hoc approach to public access
is at least partially to blame and is in need of substantial reformulation.
The lower courts appear to be hopelessly confused as to when the
experience and logic test applies outside of the narrow confines of
criminal trials and trial-like proceedings. Moreover, the test itself is too
indeterminate to provide courts with meaningful guidance in resolving
public access claims. As a result, many courts either engage in an
unstructured balancing test that discounts the benefits of public access
or they simply default to the common-law test for access.
The deficiencies with the current doctrinal framework for a public
right of access to the courts, however, mask a deeper underlying
problem with the Court’s access jurisprudence: the lack of a coherent
theoretical basis for a First Amendment right of public access in the first
place. The next Parts provide this theoretical grounding and outline an
analytically consistent public access doctrine that advances the First
Amendment values at stake in disputes over public access to the courts.
II. FIRST AMENDMENT STRUCTURALISM
The confusion and inconsistency regarding a right of public access
to the courts is not simply a doctrinal issue that can be fixed by finetuning the experience and logic test. The problem is more fundamental
and stems from uncertainty over why the First Amendment should have
anything to say about access to the courts in the first place. In other
words, why does public access to the courts advance First Amendment
values? Until we answer this question, we cannot ascertain the proper
scope of a First Amendment right of access.
Part of the challenge in answering this question is that the values
advanced by the First Amendment are contested. Indeed, scholars have
affording the various interests of the public and the press meaningful access” to judicial records
and proceedings).
263 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980) (plurality opinion).
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long debated the purposes underlying the First Amendment. 264 It is not
my aim here to crown a single unifying theory of the First Amendment.
Instead, my goal is to identify a theory (or set of theories) that explains
the Supreme Court’s recognition of a First Amendment right of public
access to criminal trials, can serve as a basis for extending that right to
other judicial activities, and can guide courts in deciding hard cases.
In the following Sections, I argue that a right of public access to the
courts flows from the recognition that the First Amendment’s speech
and press protections are intended to ensure that Americans are capable
of self-governance, a rationale most closely associated with Alexander
Meiklejohn, but also advanced by a number of First Amendment
scholars including Robert Post and Cass Sunstein. 265 Section A examines
the relevance of this theory to public access claims and explains how a
First Amendment right of access to the courts plays a critical structural
role in our constitutional system. Section B then elucidates the
structural values of court transparency and translates those values into
insights that can help courts resolve public access disputes.
A.

The First Amendment’s Purpose and Structural Role

Although the text of the First Amendment is mute about its
purposes, we can assume that the admonition that “Congress shall make
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” 266 is based
on the belief that protecting speech and the press will have salutary
effects on America’s “great experiment in democracy.” 267 Precisely how
the framers envisioned the First Amendment playing this role, however,
remains a mystery. The historical record is nearly as mute about the
purposes of the First Amendment as the text is itself. 268
264 See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE
L.J. 877, 877 (1963) [hereinafter Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment]
(“Despite the mounting number of decisions and an even greater volume of comment, no really
adequate or comprehensive theory of the first amendment has been enunciated, much less
agreed upon.”); Alexander Tsesis, Free Speech Constitutionalism, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1015,
1017 (2015) (noting the need “to identify a unified statement of free speech theory”).
265 See infra notes 282–88 and accompanying text.
266 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
267 CARL BECKER, OUR GREAT EXPERIMENT IN DEMOCRACY: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES, at x (1920) (“American ‘democracy’ was, and is, an experiment . . . .”); see also 1 ALEXIS
DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 12 (Henry Reeve trans., 3d ed., London, Saunders
& Otley 1838) (1835).
268 See 5 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAWSUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 20.5(a) (5th ed. 2012) (“There is little that anyone can draw from
the debates within the House concerning the meaning of the First Amendment. In addition,
there is the absence of useful records of debates in the Senate—or the states—on its
ratification.” (footnotes omitted)); Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Democratic First Amendment, 110
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Theories of the First Amendment

Despite a lack of historical evidence regarding the First
Amendment’s purposes, scholars and jurists have largely coalesced
around three theories justifying the First Amendment’s protections for
speech. 269 The first and perhaps most widely recognized justification for
protecting speech is the advancement of knowledge or truth, 270 which
has come to be embodied by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s famous
metaphor of a “marketplace of ideas.” 271 A second theory posits that free
speech should be protected because it advances individual autonomy
and self-fulfillment. 272 The third theory asserts that the First
Amendment’s purpose is to facilitate self-governance and participatory
democracy. 273 Although some scholars have identified a fourth
justification for the First Amendment—to serve as a check on
NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1101 (2016) [hereinafter Bhagwat, The Democratic First Amendment]
(“[T]he Free Speech Clause has the most shallow and obscure history of any provision of the
First Amendment.”).
269 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Details: Specific Facts and the First Amendment, 86 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 32 (2012) [hereinafter Bhagwat, Details]; Tsesis, supra note 264, at 1016. Because the
Supreme Court has largely eschewed giving the First Amendment’s Free Press Clause
independent meaning, see David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 430
(2002) (“[A]s a matter of positive law, the Press Clause actually plays a rather minor role in
protecting the freedom of the press.”), I focus only on the theoretical justifications for the Free
Speech Clause.
270 See, e.g., Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 755–56 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“[I]t is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail . . . .” (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969))).
271 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market . . . .”). The first articulation of the marketplace theory is typically attributed to poet
John Milton, who criticized the English system of licensing in Areopagitica in 1644:
And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth
be in the field, we do injuriously, by licensing and prohibiting, to misdoubt her
strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a
free and open encounter?
JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 35 (Jim Miller ed., Dover Thrift ed. 2016) (1644).
272 See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 47–69 (1989)
(arguing that speech is protected because it “promotes both the speaker’s self-fulfillment and
the speaker’s ability to participate in change”); Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, supra note 264, at 879 (describing freedom of expression’s role in “[t]he
achievement of self-realization”).
273 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 121–65
(1993) (contending that free speech is a “precondition” for democracy); Robert H. Bork,
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20–21 (1971) (arguing
that freedom of speech is necessary for “democratic organization”); Robert Post, Reconciling
Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2362 (2000)
[hereinafter Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine] (“The democratic theory of the First
Amendment . . . protects speech insofar as it is required by the practice of self-government.”).
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government 274—for our purposes this theory is subsumed by the selfgovernance theory. 275
The Supreme Court has never definitively adopted one theory over
the others and each has its merits. 276 Moreover, there are echoes of all of
them in the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, with the justices
drawing on different theories depending on the nature of the First
Amendment conflict at issue. Nevertheless, as I describe below, the selfgovernance theory best explains the Court’s recognition of a right of
access to the courts.
The self-governance theory rests on the conviction that speech is a
necessary precondition for a representative democracy. While scholars
and jurists point to other values that are advanced by the First
Amendment, few would dispute that a democracy cannot function
without protections for speech about the government. As the Supreme
Court noted in Mills v. Alabama, “[w]hatever differences may exist
about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically
universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to
protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.” 277 Since Mills, the
Court has continued to emphasize the importance of speech to selfgovernance, 278 including most recently in Snyder v. Phelps, where the
Court held that the First Amendment provides a defense to a claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress when the speech at issue
274 See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 2 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 521, 527 (1977) [hereinafter Blasi, Checking Value] (discussing “the value that free
speech, a free press, and free assembly can serve in checking the abuse of power by public
officials”).
275 See infra notes 282–88 and accompanying text.
276 See, e.g., Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine, supra note 273, at 2372 (“First
Amendment jurisprudence contains several operational and legitimate theories of freedom of
speech, so that it is quite implausible to aspire to clarify First Amendment doctrine by
abandoning all but one of these theories.”); Tsesis, supra note 264, at 1017 (“The Supreme
Court has been inconsistent in its application [of free speech theory], and, indeed, has never
definitively adopted one over the others.”).
277 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
278 See, e.g., Walker v. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2246 (2015)
(“[T]he Free Speech Clause helps produce informed opinions among members of the public,
who are then able to influence the choices of a government that, through words and deeds, will
reflect its electoral mandate.”); Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277,
2288 (2012) (“Our cases have often noted the close connection between our Nation’s
commitment to self-government and the rights protected by the First Amendment.”); Brown v.
Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 52 (1982) (“At the core of the First Amendment are certain basic
conceptions about the manner in which political discussion in a representative democracy
should proceed.”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 n.127 (1976) (per curiam) (“[T]he central
purpose of the Speech and Press Clauses was to assure a society in which ‘uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open’ public debate concerning matters of public interest would thrive, for only in
such a society can a healthy representative democracy flourish.” (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964))).
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relates to “a matter of public concern.” 279 According to the Court,
“[s]peech on ‘matters of public concern’ . . . is ‘at the heart of the First
Amendment’s protection,’” 280 and “speech concerning public affairs is
more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.” 281
Given the Court’s repeated statements that discussion of
government affairs is at the core of the First Amendment’s protections,
a broad consensus has emerged among constitutional scholars that the
primary purpose of the First Amendment is to make self-governance
possible. 282 This position has been adopted by a wide range of scholars,
including Ashutosh Bhagwat, 283 Robert Bork, 284 Alexander
Meiklejohn, 285 Robert Post, 286 Cass Sunstein, 287 and James Weinstein. 288
This is not to say that there is unanimity as to the precise contours
of the self-governance theory. Indeed, there continues to be deep
disagreement over how broadly speech relating to self-governance
should be defined. At least initially for Meiklejohn, such speech would
have to be explicitly political. 289 This exceedingly narrow definition
faced significant criticism from a number of quarters, 290 and Meiklejohn
ultimately revised his theory, concluding that speech about education,
562 U.S. 443, 451–52 (2011).
Id. (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758–59
(1985) (plurality opinion)).
281 Id. at 452 (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964)).
282 See KOHLER ET AL., supra note 85, at 61 (noting that the self-governance theory has
“come to dominate the field”); BeVier, supra note 26, at 502 (“[T]here is one principle [in the
First Amendment area] which both commands widespread agreement and is derived from
constitutional structure: the core first amendment value is that of the democracy embodied in
our constitutionally established processes of representative self-government.”); Bhagwat, The
Democratic First Amendment, supra note 268, at 1102 (“[A] broad consensus has emerged over
the past half-century regarding the fundamental reason why the Constitution protects free
speech: to advance democratic self-governance.”).
283 Bhagwat, Details, supra note 269, at 32–44; Ashutosh Bhagwat, Comment, Patronage and
the First Amendment: A Structural Approach, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1369, 1384–91 (1989)
[hereinafter Bhagwat, Patronage and the First Amendment].
284 Bork, supra note 273, at 20–21.
285 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 30, at 75; Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an
Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 255.
286 Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 482 (2011);
Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion,
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 670 (1990).
287 SUNSTEIN, supra note 273, at 121–65.
288 James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American Free Speech
Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 497 (2011).
289 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
105–07 (1948).
290 See, e.g., Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech: And Its Relation to Self-Government. By
Alexander Meiklejohn. New York: Harper Bros., 1948, 62 HARV. L. REV. 891, 899 (1949) (book
review) (“The most serious weakness in Mr. Meiklejohn’s argument is that it rests on his
supposed boundary between public speech and private speech.”); Harry Kalven, Jr., The
Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 15–16.
279
280
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philosophy, science, literature, and the arts could also be necessary for
self-governance. 291 Today, the debate largely revolves around defining
the modes of self-government, with scholars such as Robert Post
advancing what he calls the “participatory” theory, which “does not
locate self-governance in mechanisms of decision making, but rather in
the processes through which citizens come to identify a government as
their own.” 292
For our purposes, we need not resolve these debates because under
any definition of self-governance, public discussion about the activities
of the courts, a coordinate branch of government, would fall within even
the narrowest conception of democratic speech. But concluding that the
First Amendment protects speech about the courts only gets us part of
the way to understanding why the First Amendment should incorporate
a right of public access to information from the courts. To grasp the
nature of this link, we have to examine the structural role that the First
Amendment plays in the American constitutional system.
2.

Constitutional Structuralism

Constitutional structuralism proceeds from the insight that we
should interpret the Constitution by examining the structures of
government; i.e., the Constitution’s overall arrangement of offices,
powers, and relationships. 293 In the words of Laurence Tribe:
To understand the Constitution as a legal text, it is essential to
recognize the sort of text it is: a constitutive text that purports, in the
name of the People of the United States of America, to bring into
being a number of distinct but interrelated institutions and practices,

Meiklejohn, supra note 285, at 256–57.
Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine, supra note 273, at 2367; see also POST, supra note
22, at 61; Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public
Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1116–18 (1993).
293 SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: THE BASIC
QUESTIONS 120 (2007) (“The phrase ‘constitutional structures’ usually refers to the
constitutional relationships between the national government and the states, the branches of
the national government, the government and the people and, in sum, the general arrangement
of offices, powers, and relationships allegedly manifest in the Constitution’s text and the settled
facts of constitutional history.”); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously:
Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1236
(1995) (“I put such great emphasis upon text and structure, both the structure within the text—
the pattern and interplay in the language of the Constitution itself and its provisions—and the
structure (or architecture) outside the text—the pattern and interplay in the governmental
edifice that the Constitution describes and creates, and in the institutions and practices it
propels.” (emphasis added)).
291
292
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at once legal and political, and to define the rules governing those
institutions and practices. 294

Charles Black and John Hart Ely, two of the more influential
proponents of structural interpretation, have both offered convincing
arguments for considering constitutional rights within a structural
context. 295 In a series of lectures entitled Structure and Relationship in
Constitutional Law, Black implored his audience “to develop a fullbodied case-law of inference from constitutional structure and
relation.”296 According to Black, difficult constitutional cases are
resolved “not fundamentally on the basis of . . . textual exegesis which
we tend to regard as normal, but on the basis of reasoning from the total
structure which the text has created.” 297 Ely makes a similar argument
when he asserts that the Constitution and Bill of Rights were intended to
be blueprints for government rather than repositories of specific values;
“the body of the original Constitution is devoted almost entirely to
structure,” he observed. 298 For Ely, this insight led him to conclude that
the First Amendment was “intended to help make our governmental
processes work, to ensure the open and informed discussion of political
issues, and to check our government when it gets out of bounds.” 299
The First Amendment serves a structural function by facilitating
the communicative processes necessary for democratic self-governance.
The Amendment’s speech protections, for example, prevent the
government from stifling criticism of public officials and ensure that
debate on public issues can be “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”300
Other provisions, such as the rights of assembly, association, and
petition, serve similar ends by helping to alleviate collective-action
problems that can undermine the effective exercise of popular
sovereignty. 301 Taken together, the interrelated freedoms in the First
Tribe, supra note 293, at 1235.
See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1969); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
296 BLACK, supra note 295, at 8.
297 Id. at 15. Responding to potential criticism that structural interpretation would be too
imprecise and speculative, Black said:
294
295

The question is not whether the text shall be respected, but rather how one goes
about respecting a text of that high generality and consequent ambiguity which
marks so many crucial constitutional texts. I submit that the generalities and
ambiguities are no greater when one applies the method of reasoning from structure
and relation.
Id. at 30–31.
298 ELY, supra note 295, at 90.
299 Id. at 93–94.
300 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
301 See Tabatha Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right of Assembly, 56 UCLA L. REV. 543, 543
(2009); see also Jason Mazzone, Freedom’s Associations, 77 WASH. L. REV. 639, 743 (2002); Ozan
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Amendment serve critical structural purposes in our constitutional
system.
The Supreme Court has long relied on structural insights to
interpret the First Amendment. In fact, one cannot make sense of
modern First Amendment jurisprudence without acknowledging the
Court’s reliance on the structural role of the First Amendment. For
more than a century after ratification of the First Amendment, the
consensus among jurists and scholars was that the Amendment’s reach
was quite limited, prohibiting only prior restraints on speech. 302 Even
Justice Holmes, in a decision that predated his famous defense of the
First Amendment in Abrams v. United States, 303 initially believed that
the First Amendment imposed no limits on the government’s ability to
levy criminal penalties against publishers. 304 It was not until well into
the twentieth century that the Supreme Court settled on a broader
interpretation of the First Amendment, and it has gradually expanded
the First Amendment’s ambit ever since.
During the 1930s, for example, the Court moved from the cramped
understanding of the First Amendment as applying only to prior
restraints and began striking down government penalties directed at
speech, noting that “free political discussion” plays an essential role in
“our constitutional system” and remarking that in such discussion “lies
the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional
government.” 305 Further emphasizing the role that speech plays under
the Constitution, the Court also began to expand the First Amendment’s
protections to cover indirect forms of government censorship, such as

O. Varol, Structural Rights, 105 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 37–39) (on file
with author).
302 See David S. Ardia, Freedom of Speech, Defamation, and Injunctions, 55 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1, 34 (2013) [hereinafter Ardia, Freedom of Speech] (discussing early American
conceptions of the First Amendment).
303 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“I think that we should be eternally
vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be
fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful
and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country.”).
304 See Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Attorney Gen., 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (affirming
criminal contempt sanction against the publisher of the Rocky Mountain News and concluding
“the main purpose of [the First Amendment’s free speech protections] is ‘to prevent all such
previous restraints upon publications as had been practised by other governments’” (quoting
Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304, 313 (1825))).
305 De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937) (invalidating criminal conviction for
subversive speech); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (“The maintenance of the
opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the
will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential
to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.”).
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the imposition of a licensing tax on newspaper publishers 306 and
restrictions on the right to receive information. 307
In the 1960s, the Court further expanded the reach of the First
Amendment by imposing constitutional limitations on the common-law
of defamation. Explicitly invoking the structural role that speech plays
in a democracy, the Court proclaimed in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
that even false speech about public officials is deserving of First
Amendment protection. 308 In what has become an essential part of the
First Amendment canon, the Court remarked that the First Amendment
embodies “a profound national commitment to the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”309
Quoting extensively from the writings of James Madison, the Court in
Sullivan observed that the “Constitution created a form of government
under which ‘The people, not the government, possess the absolute
sovereignty.’” 310 Agreeing with Madison about the critical role that
speech plays in self-government, the Court concluded: “The right of free
public discussion of the stewardship of public officials was thus . . . a
fundamental principle of the American form of government.”311
Echoes of this view can also be heard in the Supreme Court’s
decisions today. 312 Cautioning against allowing the government to
dictate what information should be available to the public, Justice
Douglas observed that “[t]he generation that made the nation thought
secrecy in government one of the instruments of Old World tyranny
and committed itself to the principle that a democracy cannot function
unless the people are permitted to know what their government is up
306 See Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249–50 (1936) (stating that “informed public
opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment” and concluding that the First
Amendment protects not only against prior restraints but also “any action of the government
by means of which it might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as seems
absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their rights”).
307 See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 306 (1965) (“Just as the licensing or taxing
authorities in the Lovell, Thomas, and Murdock cases sought to control the flow of ideas to the
public, so here federal agencies regulate the flow of mail.”); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S.
141, 143 (1943) (noting that “freedom of speech and press has broad scope” and holding that
“[t]his freedom embraces the right to distribute literature, and necessarily protects the right to
receive it” (citation omitted)).
308 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). “The Court was concerned that public officials could stifle free
debate by bringing defamation actions against their critics, much as they had stifled debate
using the Sedition Act of 1798.” David S. Ardia, Reputation in a Networked World: Revisiting
the Social Foundations of Defamation Law, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 261, 280 (2010).
309 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
310 Id. at 274.
311 Id. at 275.
312 See, e.g., Walker v. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2246 (2015)
(“[T]he Free Speech Clause helps produce informed opinions among members of the public,
who are then able to influence the choices of a government that, through words and deeds, will
reflect its electoral mandate.”).
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to.” 313 “This phrase should not be dismissed as a convenient formalism,”
the Court warned in National Archives and Records Administration v.
Favish, “[i]t defines a structural necessity in a real democracy.” 314
We can draw three important conclusions from the preceding
discussion. First, a primary purpose of the First Amendment is to make
self-governance possible. Second, self-governance is not feasible without
informed public discourse about the government. Third, the First
Amendment plays an essential structural role in our constitutional
system because it ensures that citizens can engage in expressive activities
that are essential to self-government. The self-governance theory and
constitutional structuralism, therefore, are mutually reinforcing. While
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open discussion of government affairs
may be beneficial in its own right, its value from a structuralist
perspective is that it makes self-government possible.
B.

The Structural Values of Court Transparency

Prior to the Supreme Court’s plurality decision in Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, the Court had never held that the First
Amendment provides a right of access to information of any kind.
Instead, the Court seemed to view the question of whether the public
should have access to information, including information held by the
government, as a political issue beyond the purview of the courts. 315
Even after Richmond Newspapers, the Supreme Court has continued to
reject the notion that there is a general First Amendment right of access
to government information. 316 It is only in the context of criminal trial
and trial-like proceedings that the Court has explicitly held that the First
Amendment requires a right of public access. 317
What is it about criminal court proceedings that explains this
disparate treatment under the First Amendment? The following
Sections examine the underpinnings of the Court’s recognition of a First
Amendment right of access to criminal trials and the values that are
advanced by public access to the courts. As discussed below, the
313 U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 772–73
(1989) (quoting EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 105 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
314 541 U.S. 157, 171–72 (2004) (citing Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. at
773).
315 See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 12 (1978) (concluding that a claim of access to a
county jail “invites the Court to involve itself in what is clearly a legislative task which the
Constitution has left to the political processes”).
316 See McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709, 1718 (2013); L.A. Police Dep’t v. United
Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 40 (1999).
317 See supra Section I.A.3.
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judiciary, by virtue of its unique institutional position within the
government, possesses information that is essential to informed selfgovernment. By elucidating the distinctive characteristics of the courts
and the information they contain, we will be able to understand the
justification—and potential limits—of a First Amendment right of
access to information about the courts.
1.

The First Amendment as Sword

The First Amendment, as we have already noted, is mute about its
purposes. History is similarly inscrutable as to what role, if any, the First
Amendment was intended to play in ensuring that the public has access
to information about the workings of the government. The framers do
not appear to have ever confronted the question of whether the
Constitution guarantees a right of access to information about the
government, and the issue did not arise in the Supreme Court until well
into the twentieth century. In the absence of guidance from the text and
history of the First Amendment, we are left to reason from the structure
of government established by the Constitution in order to assess
whether a right of public access to the courts is demanded by the
principles underlying the First Amendment’s protections for speech.
Because speech related to self-governance is at the core of the First
Amendment’s protections, the Supreme Court, at least since 1931, 318 has
roundly condemned government efforts to restrict or punish speech
about the government, including speech about the activities of the
courts. 319 But this does not establish that the First Amendment requires
the government to provide access to information in its possession.
There still remains an important conceptual jump from the conclusion
that the First Amendment prohibits the government from punishing
speech about the government (absent sufficiently compelling reasons) to
the conclusion that the First Amendment requires the government to
provide access to information about its activities. When the government
318 See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (applying First Amendment to
invalidate state law restricting speech).
319 See, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g. Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (invalidating restriction on
the publication of name of youth charged as a juvenile offender); Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v.
Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (invalidating restrictions on the disclosure of information
regarding proceedings before a state judicial review commission); Okla. Publ’g. Co. v. Dist.
Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (invalidating restriction on the publication of name or picture of
minor child involved in juvenile proceeding); Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976)
(invalidating restrictions on the publication or broadcasting of pre-trial accounts of admissions
made by defendant to law enforcement officers); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469
(1975) (invalidating restriction on publication of rape victim name acquired from court
records).
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refuses to provide access to information in its possession, it neither
directly restrains nor imposes punishment on information-gathering
activities. To justify the conclusion that the First Amendment requires
the government to provide public access to the courts, one must
conclude that the First Amendment embodies an affirmative
constitutional obligation to ensure that public discussion of
governmental affairs is informed.
Although the question of whether the First Amendment embodies
a general affirmative right to information continues to be vigorously
debated by scholars, 320 the Supreme Court already has made this leap in
the context of public access to certain criminal proceedings. The Court’s
decisions in Richmond Newspapers, Globe Newspaper, and PressEnterprise I & II go beyond the view that the First Amendment only
prohibits government censorship to encompass a right to acquire
information from the courts. It cannot be overstated how important
these cases were and how sharply they diverged from the Court’s earlier
decisions that had rejected a First Amendment right of access to
government information. 321 Justice Stevens remarked on the
significance of the Court’s shift in his concurring opinion in Richmond
Newspapers:
This is a watershed case. Until today the Court has accorded virtually
absolute protection to the dissemination of information or ideas, but
never before has it squarely held that the acquisition of newsworthy
matter is entitled to any constitutional protection whatsoever. . . . I
agree that the First Amendment protects the public and the press
from abridgment of their rights of access to information about the
operation of their government, including the Judicial Branch . . . . 322

While Stevens was right that Richmond Newspapers was a
watershed case, there are earlier hints of an affirmative First
Amendment right to information in the opinions of various justices,
many of whom adopted Meiklejohnian and Madisonian rhetoric. Recall,
for example, that in Branzburg v. Hayes, the Court suggested that “news
gathering is not without its First Amendment protections.” 323 And,
although a three-justice plurality in Houchins v. KQED, Inc. held that
320 Compare, e.g., Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, supra note 26, at 5–14
(arguing that a complete “system of freedom of expression” must include an affirmative First
Amendment right of access to information), with BeVier, supra note 26, at 516–17 (“The
Constitution yields no normative standard by which the claim of access to governmental
information can be evaluated.”). Barry McDonald offers a thorough recounting of the historical
debate on this issue and its contemporary resonance. See generally McDonald, supra note 43.
321 See supra Sections I.A.1–I.A.2.
322 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 582, 584 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
323 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972).
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the First Amendment did not mandate a right of access to prisons,324
Justice Stevens’s impassioned dissent joined by Justices Brennan and
Powell asserted that “[t]he preservation of a full and free flow of
information to the general public has long been recognized as a core
objective of the First Amendment,” 325 and “[w]ithout some protection
for the acquisition of information about the operation of public
institutions such as prisons by the public at large, the process of selfgovernance contemplated by the Framers would be stripped of its
substance.”326
Given this view of the First Amendment, it is not surprising that
when Justice Brennan penned the majority opinion in Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Superior Court, he wrote that “[u]nderlying the First Amendment
right of access to criminal trials is the common understanding that ‘a
major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of
governmental affairs,’” and that “[b]y offering such protection, the First
Amendment serves to ensure that the individual citizen can effectively
participate in and contribute to our republican system of selfgovernment.” 327 Indeed, Brennan had made a similar argument in his
Richmond Newspapers concurrence where he linked the First
Amendment’s purpose to its “structural role” of “fostering . . . selfgovernment.” 328 Brennan went on to explain what this meant:
Implicit in this structural role is not only “the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,” but
also the antecedent assumption that valuable public debate—as well
as other civic behavior—must be informed. The structural model
links the First Amendment to that process of communication
necessary for a democracy to survive, and thus entails solicitude not
only for communication itself, but also for the indispensable
conditions of meaningful communication. 329

Although the Court’s decisions in Richmond Newspapers and Globe
Newspaper relied explicitly on the structural values advanced by court
access, the Court muddled the theoretical justifications for a First
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15 (1978) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
326 Id. at 32.
327 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982) (quoting Mills v.
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
328 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
329 Id. at 587–88 (Brennan, J., concurring) (footnote omitted) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)); see also William J. Brennan, Jr., Assoc. Justice of the
Supreme Court of the U.S., Address at the Dedication of the S.I. Newhouse Center for Law and
Justice in Newark, New Jersey (Oct. 17, 1979) (“[T]he First Amendment protects the structure
of communications necessary for the existence of our democracy.”).
324
325
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Amendment right of access in the Press-Enterprise cases. While the
outcomes in Press-Enterprise I & II support structuralist ends, the means
the Court used to achieve those ends do not comport with a structuralist
perspective of the First Amendment. 330 First, Chief Justice Burger, who
wrote the majority opinions in both cases, did not adopt the expansive
language that Brennan and Stevens had used in describing the need for
public access. The advantages Burger articulates, enhancing the fairness
of criminal proceedings, assuring public confidence in the justice
system, and checking potential abuses of judicial power, 331 do not
directly advance the democracy-enhancing structural goals of the First
Amendment, although his reference to the “community therapeutic
value” 332 of public access might be seen as doing so. By focusing on the
instrumental benefits of public access, Burger left the impression that
the First Amendment right of access to the courts rests solely on the
benefits that public access provides in individual cases. 333
Second, the experience and logic test that Burger announced and
applied in Press-Enterprise II further obscures the locus of a
constitutional right of access to the courts. In making a right of access
contingent on “whether public access plays a significant positive role in
the functioning of the particular process in question,” 334 Burger offered
too cramped a view of the “logic of openness,” focusing only on the role
that public access plays in individual court proceedings and eschewing a
broader structural perspective that considers how public access
advances democratic values. As a result, the Press-Enterprise cases have
left the lower courts confused as to which benefits matter most when
considering public access claims: the advantages that public access
confers on a specific proceeding, the benefits that transparency provides
for the court system as a whole, or the structural values that access

330 See Joseph F. Kobylka & David M. Dehnel, Toward a Structuralist Understanding of First
and Sixth Amendment Guarantees, 21 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 363, 386–87 (1986).
331 See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1986); Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 508
(1984).
332 Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 13; Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 508.
333 Justice Stevens commented on this very point in his concurrence in Press-Enterprise I:

The focus commanded by the First Amendment makes it appropriate to emphasize
the fact that the underpinning of our holding today is not simply the interest in
effective judicial administration; the First Amendment’s concerns are much broader.
The “common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters
relating to the functioning of government,” that underlies the decision of cases of this
kind provides protection to all members of the public “from abridgment of their
rights of access to information about the operation of their government, including
the Judicial Branch.”
Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 517 (citations omitted).
Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8 (emphasis added).

334
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serves by exposing the public to information necessary for selfgovernance.
In fact, it makes little sense to base a First Amendment right of
access on the benefits that public access provides to individual court
proceedings, or even to the court system as a whole. While a just and
effective court system is undoubtedly an important public good, it is not
a core First Amendment value. Public access takes on First Amendment
significance because it advances the First Amendment’s structural
purpose. To wit, public access is of constitutional significance because it
makes self-government possible. By putting the structural goals of the
First Amendment in the foreground, we can arrive at a much clearer
understanding of the justifications for—and potential limits of—a First
Amendment right of access.
2.

Higher-Order Constitutional Values

There is much to be said about the benefits of court transparency.
Over the years judges and scholars have identified a variety of benefits
that flow from allowing the public to observe the activities of the courts,
including: (1) safeguarding the integrity of the fact-finding process; 335
(2) ensuring the fairness of judicial proceedings; 336 (3) educating the
public about the implementation and impact of the law; 337 (4)
promoting public confidence in the justice system; 338 (5) supporting the
development of the common law; 339 (6) informing the public about
important safety and welfare issues; 340 and (7) fostering discussion about
335 See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982) (“Public
scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of the factfinding
process, with benefits to both the defendant and to society as a whole.”).
336 See, e.g., Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 509 (“[P]ublic proceedings vindicate the concerns
of the victims and the community in knowing that offenders are being brought to account for
their criminal conduct . . . .”); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1313–14 (7th Cir. 1984)
(noting that public access to court documents advances “the public’s interest in assuring that
the courts are fairly run and judges are honest” (quoting Crystal Grower’s Corp. v. Dobbins,
616 F.2d 458, 461 (10th Cir. 1980))).
337 See, e.g., United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 827 (3d Cir. 1981) (noting “the
educational and informational value of public observation” of court records).
338 See, e.g., Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 508 (“Openness thus enhances both the basic
fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in
the system.”).
339 See Symposium, Panel Discussion Judicial Records Forum, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1735,
1745–46 (2015) [hereinafter Panel Discussion] (Kenneth J. Withers asserting that access to
court proceedings and records reveals how court decisions are made so that the basis for
precedent is available for future litigants and courts to use in the development of the common
law).
340 See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“[T]he right of
inspection serves to produce ‘an informed and enlightened public opinion.’” (quoting Grosjean
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matters of public concern. 341 Public access even provides therapeutic
benefits to the community, as Chief Justice Burger noted in Richmond
Newspapers:
The early history of open trials in part reflects the widespread
acknowledgment, long before there were behavioral scientists, that
public trials had significant community therapeutic value. Even
without such experts to frame the concept in words, people sensed
from experience and observation that, especially in the
administration of criminal justice, the means used to achieve justice
must have the support derived from public acceptance of both the
process and its results. 342

Although this is just a partial list, it highlights the broad range of
benefits that can arise from public access to the courts. Not all of these
benefits, however, support the recognition of a First Amendment right
of access. Indeed, even a cursory review of the list above reveals that
some of the purported advantages of public access serve only
functionalist ends.
In order to identify which benefits provide support for a First
Amendment right of access, it will be helpful to characterize the
potential benefits of public access in terms of the type of impact they
have: “first-order benefits” impact the functioning of specific court
proceedings, “second-order benefits” affect the judicial system as a
whole, and “third-order benefits” influence society broadly.
a. First-Order Benefits
Public access to the courts clearly provides significant first-order
benefits and, indeed, this is where much of the attention has typically
been directed in the debate over a First Amendment right of access.
Judges and scholars have long recognized the first-order benefits that
flow from public access to court proceedings, including keeping
witnesses, judges, and other trial participants honest; 343 generating

v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 247 (1936))), rev’d sub nom, Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc.,
435 U.S. 598 (1978).
341 See, e.g., Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978) (“The operation
of the Virginia Commission, no less than the operation of the judicial system itself, is a matter
of public interest, necessarily engaging the attention of the news media.”).
342 448 U.S. 555, 570–71 (1980) (plurality opinion).
343 See, e.g., Littlejohn v. Bic Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 678 (3d Cir. 1988) (observing that open
access “promotes public confidence in the judicial system by enhancing testimonial
trustworthiness and the quality of justice dispensed by the court”); Ex parte Capital U-Drive-It,
Inc., 630 S.E.2d 464, 469 (S.C. 2006) (“Public access discourages perjury and encourages
bringing the truth to light because participants are less likely to testify falsely in a sunlit
courtroom before their neighbors than in a private room before court officials.”).
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additional witnesses and evidence; 344 and, in the criminal context,
dissuading the government from engaging in unjust prosecutions. 345
First-order benefits obviously serve functionalist ends by
improving the operation of court proceedings. This is not to denigrate
the importance of these instrumental benefits. In fact, courts should put
great value on improving the fairness and functioning of court
proceedings. But that does not mean that the First Amendment should
require public access in order to secure these benefits. While first-order
benefits might implicate other important rights, 346 they do not directly
advance the core justificatory theories underlying the First
Amendment’s speech and press clause guarantees. 347
b. Second-Order Benefits
Second-order benefits, which affect the functioning of the court
system as a whole, also flow from providing public access to the courts.
Public access, for example, promotes public confidence in the justice
system, 348 supports the development of the common law, 349 and enables
lawyers and parties to improve their arguments and predict the
outcomes of their cases. 350 Public access also impacts the efficiency of
the courts by decreasing the filing of frivolous claims and increasing the
likelihood of settlements. 351 In addition, public access plays an
important role in exposing and reducing bias and corruption within the
court system. Public access, especially to court records, makes it more
344 See, e.g., Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984) (“[A] public trial encourages witnesses
to come forward and discourages perjury.”); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 n.24 (1948) (“Public
trials come to the attention of key witnesses unknown to the parties.”); United States ex rel.
Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599, 606 (3d Cir. 1969) (“[A] public trial may lead, even
accidentally, to the appearance of an important witness who, having heard the testimony, may
come forward with relevant new evidence . . . .”).
345 See, e.g., Westchester Rockland Newspapers, Inc. v. Leggett, 48 N.Y.2d 430, 437 (1979)
(noting that public access to court proceedings protects an accused from “unjust persecution
[sic] by public officials”).
346 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII.
347 See supra Section II.A.1 for a discussion of the various theories underlying the First
Amendment.
348 See, e.g., Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984) (“Openness thus enhances both the
basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public
confidence in the system.”). The moral authority of judges, upon which their power is largely
based, is dependent upon the public’s trust, which cannot be gained or retained without public
oversight.
349 See Panel Discussion, supra note 339, at 1745–46.
350 See Lynn M. LoPucki, Court-System Transparency, 94 IOWA L. REV. 481, 498–510 (2009)
(describing how increased court transparency leads to better predictions of litigation
outcomes).
351 It is also believed that public access to the courts will reduce the frequency of legal
malpractice because lawyers will be able to observe and learn from the mistakes of others. See
id. at 510–13.
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likely that systemic problems will be identified, corrected, and
deterred. 352 As the California Supreme Court observed: “If public court
business is conducted in private, it becomes impossible to expose
corruption, incompetence, inefficiency, prejudice, and favoritism.” 353
Again, these are laudable benefits. But like first-order effects, they
serve functionalist goals in improving the functioning of the court
system and do not directly support the recognition of a First
Amendment right of access to the courts.
c. Third-Order Benefits
As we move into identifying the third-order benefits of public
access, we begin to see how public access to the courts can advance the
structural values underlying the First Amendment. Third-order benefits
include informing the public about the exercise of governmental power,
educating individuals about the implementation and impact of the law,
and fostering discussion about matters of public concern. These
benefits, which extend beyond the justice system itself, play an
important structural role in our constitutional system by increasing
citizens’ ability to exercise self-governance. 354
Public access to the courts, for example, makes it possible for
individuals to know what laws govern them. Although the courts are
often thought of merely as an instrument for resolving disputes, that
misunderstands their importance in the American legal system. As
every first-year law student discovers, statutes—and constitutions—are
full of vague standards. Those standards do not begin to take on
concrete meaning until the courts interpret and implement them. Public
access to the courts, especially the raw materials with which the courts
352 Lynn LoPucki, who has done important work in this area, describes how researchers can
use statistical tools to analyze case outcomes, noting that such tools can determine if judge-tojudge differences are attributable to the judges themselves or random differences in the cases
assigned to the judges. Id. at 494–95; see also MD. COURTS, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS at 7, http://www.courts.state.md.us/access/finalreport3-02.pdf (last
visited Oct. 31, 2016) (“Access to court records, and especially electronic court records, enables
the public to learn of, and correct, lapses in the system—whether these take the form of
injustice in an individual civil or criminal case or in a previously unrecognized pattern of
cases.”).
353 NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court, 980 P.2d 337, 360 n.28 (Cal. 1999)
(quoting In re Estate of Hearst, 136 Cal. Rptr. 821, 824 (Ct. App. 1977)).
354 Not all third-order effects advance structuralist goals. For example, public access to the
courts informs the public about important safety and welfare issues. See supra notes 340–42 and
accompanying text. In addition, access to information about businesses and individuals who
are involved in criminal and civil cases allows members of the public to make better-informed
decisions about what products to buy, where to work, who to hire, and who to take on as
tenants, among other things. See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS,
supra note 352, at 7. These are all important societal benefits, but they do not directly advance
the First Amendment’s structural goals.
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work (e.g., evidence, witnesses, legal arguments), is essential for the
public to understand the application of the law and the mechanisms by
which it is formed. 355 As the D.C. Circuit stated:
A court proceeding, unlike the processes for much decisionmaking
by executive and legislative officials, is in its entirety and by its very
nature a matter of legal significance; all of the documents filed with
the court, as well as the transcript of the proceeding itself, are
maintained as the official “record” of what transpired. 356

The courts also provide a crucial forum where disputes over the
proper application of government power are aired and, at least in some
cases, resolved. Courtroom fights over the excessive use of police force
make police tactics visible. 357 Lawsuits over the safety of drugs,
automobiles, and other products reveal the research behind these widely
used products and allow the public to assess their societal costs and
benefits. 358 In fact, court cases are full of experts on every conceivable
issue, from DNA sequencing to the safety of automobile ignition
switches. As Lynn LoPucki has noted, “the courts are among the most
information-rich institutions in society.” 359
It is important to recognize, however, that a structuralist
justification for a First Amendment right of access to the courts does not
turn on whether public access to a particular court proceeding or
record—standing alone—would advance democratic self-governance.
This distinction marks a critical difference between structuralist and
functionalist justifications for court transparency. Many judges and
scholars who support a right of public access to the courts focus on the
355 See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski, 868 F.2d 497, 502 (1st Cir. 1989) (“The basis for this
[First Amendment] right is that without access to documents the public often would not have a
‘full understanding’ of the proceeding and therefore would not always be in a position to serve
as an effective check on the system.” (citing In re Globe Newspaper Co., 729 F.2d 47, 52 (1st
Cir. 1984))); Peter W. Martin, Online Access to Court Records—From Documents to Data,
Particulars to Patterns, 53 VILL. L. REV. 855, 859 (2008) (“[E]ffective public understanding and
scrutiny of the judicial process require access to rulings of the court and to documents filed by
parties.”).
356 Wash. Legal Found. v. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 89 F.3d 897, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
357 See, e.g., Keith L. Alexander, Baltimore Reaches $6.4 Million Settlement with Freddie
Gray’s Family, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/
baltimore-reaches-64-million-settlement-with-freddie-grays-family/2015/09/08/80b2c0925196-11e5-8c19-0b6825aa4a3a_story.html (reporting on the settlement of tort claims against
the city of Baltimore, nearly five months after twenty-five-year-old was critically injured in
police custody, sparking days of protests and rioting).
358 See, e.g., Marie McCullough, Cancer Questions over Popular Diabetes Drugs Raise Furor,
INQUIRER (Phila.) (Feb. 19, 2016, 3:31 AM), http://www.philly.com/philly/health/cancer/
20160221_Cancer_questions_over_popular_diabetes_drugs_raise_furor.html (reporting on
lawsuit against Merck claiming the company did not disclose the side effect of taking Januvia,
the company’s blockbuster diabetes drug).
359 LoPucki, supra note 350, at 510.
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benefits that accrue from the public dissemination of specific types of
information. Under this approach, public access is justified only when
the information the pubic gains is relevant to a matter of public concern.
If a court proceeding or record involves solely “private matters,” public
access is assumed to serve no societal benefit.
Structuralists, on the other hand, see public access as justified
regardless of whether the specific information gained by the public
relates to a matter of public concern because what the public is
observing is the exercise of judicial power. In other words, the structural
benefits of public access transcend individual cases. Civil, criminal,
juvenile, and family law cases all involve the exercise of government
power regardless of the identity of the litigants or the legal issues
involved.
Public access is therefore needed even in cases that do not appear
to touch on issues of public concern. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
while still a jurist on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
captured this understanding of the need for public access in Cowley v.
Pulsifer, where he affirmed the privilege to report on court proceedings:
It is desirable that the trial of causes should take place under the
public eye, not because the controversies of one citizen with another
are of public concern, but because it is of the highest moment that
those who administer justice should always act under the sense of
public responsibility, and that every citizen should be able to satisfy
himself with his own eyes as to the mode in which a public duty is
performed. 360

Not surprisingly, functionalist and structuralist justifications can
lead to different approaches to the question of court access.
Functionalists tend to rely on balancing tests to assess whether First
Amendment interests should be favored over other interests in
particular cases. 361 Although these balancing tests can vary in the
importance they assign to First Amendment values, the key
distinguishing feature of a functionalist approach is that it views an
informed public as only one value a court must consider when nonspeech interests are implicated by public access. 362
For structuralists, informed public discourse is the preeminent
value because all other values rest on the capacity of citizens to selfgovern. While not discounting the beneficial role that public access
360 Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884). Although Holmes is referring to the role
that public access plays in ensuring the accountability of judges, the government as a whole is
also held accountable by providing public access to the courts, regardless of whether individual
cases are considered to be of public concern.
361 See supra Section I.B.3.
362 Kobylka & Dehnel, supra note 330, at 369–71.
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plays in specific court proceedings, a structuralist approach looks past
individual court proceedings to focus on the broader public interest
served by the dissemination of information about the courts, which play
a uniquely important structural role in our constitutional system. 363As
described below, this may result in public access rights taking
precedence in cases that would not pass a functionalist’s balancing test,
but such a result is deemed necessary to preserve higher-order values.
3.

Court Transparency and Self-Governance

Public access to the courts is essential if the public is to understand
the contours and operation of their government. The courts are a
central locus where government policies are contested, where rights are
recognized or disavowed, and where social change is often implemented
or delayed. Because the public is generally precluded from observing the
internal deliberations of government, public access to the courts helps to
mitigate the informational asymmetry that exists between citizens and
the government, 364 an asymmetry that challenges the very notion of
democratic control. James Madison, the drafter of the First
Amendment, understood the need for an informed populace when he
warned that “popular government, without popular information, or the
means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or,
perhaps both.” 365
As Madison recognized, public understanding of the distribution
of power between citizens and the government and between the various
branches of government is a precondition for any system of selfgovernment. The entire theory of self-governance that animates the
First Amendment rests on this basic insight about the link between
informed public discourse and citizen sovereignty. In the words of
Alexander Meiklejohn:
The welfare of the community requires that those who decide issues
shall understand them. . . . Just so far as, at any point, the citizens
who are to decide an issue are denied acquaintance with information
or opinion . . . which is relevant to that issue, just so far the result
must be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for the general good. It
is that mutilation of the thinking process of the community against
which the First Amendment to the Constitution is directed.366
See infra Section II.B.4.
See Varol, supra note 301 (manuscript at 36).
365 Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 103, 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
366 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 30, at 26–27.
363
364
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Although many of our most consequential legal, social, and
political issues are debated in the courts, information that is relevant to
self-governance does not arise only in controversial cases. The issues
that are contested in the courts—even in apparently mundane cases—as
well as the manner in which these disputes are addressed and resolved
by the courts are of public concern because every case involves the
exercise of government power. In her influential work on the benefits of
open courts, Judith Resnik asked, “[w]hat is the utility of having a
window into the mundane as well as the dramatic?” 367 According to
Resnik, even ordinary legal disputes play an important role in informing
the public about the exercise of governmental power:
That is where people live and that is where state control can be both
useful and yet overreaching. The dense and tedious repetition of
ordinary exchanges is where one finds the enormity of the power of
both bureaucratic states and private sector actors. That power is at
risk of operating unseen. The redundancy of various claims of right
and the processes, allegations, and behaviors that become the
predicates to judgments can fuel debate not only about the responses
in particular cases but also about what the underlying norms ought
to be. 368

Resnick goes on to provide examples of disputes that have
traditionally been considered as outside customary public discourse and
explains how public awareness of how the courts treat these issues can
generate new rights and limitations:
So-called “domestic violence” provides one ready example of the role
of public processes in reorienting an understanding of what was once
cabined as “private” and tolerated as within the familial realm. Civil
and criminal litigation about violence against women has helped to
shape an understanding of how gender-based violence is a
mechanism of subordination and an abuse of power. 369

As Resnik suggests, public access to the courts can alert the public
to the need for legal and governmental reforms, thus allowing
democratic sovereignty to remain located in the people. Courts are the
principal mechanism through which the government exercises a broad
range of powers, including allocating rights, transferring assets,
recognizing and reconfiguring families, authorizing the receipt of
government benefits, regulating commercial transactions, and
legitimizing violence against individuals who violate the criminal law.
367 Judith Resnik, Bring Back Bentham: “Open Courts,” “Terror Trials,” and Public Sphere(s),
5 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 2, 56 (2011).
368 Id.
369 Id.
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Court transparency allows the public to observe the exercise of these
powers and to “see that law varies by contexts, decision makers,
litigants, and facts.” 370 Moreover, Resnik notes, the public and the
parties involved “gain a chance to argue that the governing rules or their
applications are wrong.” 371 Public access to the courts thus instantiates
the democratic promise that laws can change through public input.
Although we might be skeptical that the public will make proper
use of the information it gains from observing the courts, 372 this does
not negate the need for access in the first place. If citizens are the
ultimate sovereigns, as the Constitution presupposes, they must have
access to the information necessary to evaluate the actions of their
government, whether they actually make use of this information or not.
This fundamental principle underlies the First Amendment’s structural
role as a facilitator of democratic control. The Constitution’s protections
would be hollow indeed if the government were able to foreclose public
access to the courts, which sit at the critical interface between the
exercise of governmental power and the public, simply because the
government feels that the public is incapable of making effective use of
the information. Moreover, if the government were to manage public
access to the courts in this way, it would rob the government of its
legitimacy. As Robert Post warns, “[t]he public sphere can sustain
democratic legitimation only insofar as it is beyond the grasp of
comprehensive state managerial control.” 373 For Post, “[a] state that
controls our knowledge controls our minds.” 374
4.

The Unique Structural Role of the Courts

At this point in our analysis, some readers may think that the
courts are just another indistinct part of the government, and therefore
the rationales for recognizing a First Amendment right of access to the
courts apply equally well to the other branches of government. Although
it may be the case that a First Amendment right of access should be
Id. at 61.
Id.
372 See Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 928–32 (2006)
(questioning the existence of an interested public that needs and wants to be fully informed
about the government). Self-governance also depends upon the existence of a virtuous and
altruistic citizenry, see, for example, William P. Marshall, Religion As Ideas: Religion As
Identity, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 385, 388 n.16 (1996), which some would say bears little
resemblance to civic life today. See generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE
COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000).
373 POST, supra note 22, at 19.
374 Id. at 33.
370
371
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extended to other parts of the government, 375 we need not go that far
because the courts play a unique structural role in our constitutional
system that makes a right of public access to the courts particularly
compelling from the standpoint of self-governance.
First, the courts do not exercise power in the same way the
legislative and executive branches do. While all three branches are
integral to the system of checks and balances created by the
Constitution, the courts play a special role in the law-making process.
Alexander Hamilton once remarked that the judiciary is “the least
dangerous” branch because it has neither the ability nor the resources to
create and enforce laws. 376 Perhaps Hamilton forgot about the common
law, but even in the realm of statutes and regulations, the courts in
matters both mundane and momentous often serve as the final arbiters
of the reach and interpretation of the law. 377 Moreover, since Marbury v.
Madison, the courts have assumed for themselves the final say in
interpreting the Constitution’s provisions. 378
Despite this outsized power, the courts do not share the same
democratic constraints that the legislative and executive branches do.
Federal judges have lifetime tenure, as do many state court judges. 379
And even in states that do elect judges, most of these elections are nonpartisan or uncontested retention elections 380 that do not subject the
courts to the same political controls as the legislative and executive
branches. “Judges are not politicians, even when they come to the bench
by way of the ballot,” Chief Justice John Roberts Jr. observed in
Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar. 381 As he noted, “[p]oliticians are expected
to be appropriately responsive to the preferences of their supporters,”
375 Other scholars have argued this. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 26, at 3 (concluding that the
First Amendment should provide a right of access to all government institutions where it is
necessary to ensure democratic control); McDonald, supra note 43, at 256–57 (asserting that
the First Amendment should provide a right to gather information from the government and
other sources).
376 THE FEDERALIST NOS. 78, 81 (Alexander Hamilton).
377 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 595 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (“Under our system, judges are not mere umpires, but, in their own sphere,
lawmakers—a coordinate branch of government.”).
378 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). To further cast doubt on Hamilton’s sanguine view of the
courts, it should be noted that the courts are a significant and growing part of the government,
both in terms of their reach and budget. “In 1850, fewer than forty federal judges worked at the
trial level in the United States, . . . . [b]y 2000, more than 1700 trial-level judges worked in more
than 550 federal courthouse facilities.” Resnik, supra note 367, at 68.
379 According to the American Bar Association, twelve states grant life tenure or use longterm appointments of some type for their highest courts. See Fact Sheet, Am. Bar Ass’n, Fact
Sheet on Judicial Selection Methods in the States (Sept. 4, 2002), http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/fact_sheet.authcheckdam.pdf.
380 Id.
381 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1662 (2015) (affirming restrictions on judicial candidate’s right to
personally solicit campaign funds in an election).
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whereas this “is not true of judges.” 382 To the contrary, “[a] judge
instead must ‘observe the utmost fairness,’ striving to be ‘perfectly and
completely independent.’” 383
Yet, in one of the great ironies of our constitutional system, the
courts are tasked with ensuring that the other branches of government
remain democratic. 384 John Hart Ely, who has written extensively about
constitutional structure, calls this the “representation-reinforcing” role
of the judiciary, which involves “policing the mechanisms by which the
system seeks to ensure that our elected representatives will actually
represent.” 385 According to Ely, judges must guard against insiders using
the system to “chok[e] off the channels of political change to ensure that
they will stay in and the outs will stay out,” and against “representatives
beholden to an effective majority . . . systematically disadvantaging some
minority . . . thereby denying that minority the protection afforded
other groups by a representative system.” 386
Second, the other branches of government operate more directly in
the public eye. The work of the legislative branch, for example, typically
involves some degree of public debate and results in published
legislation that is broadly targeted. Legislative enactments, as well as
their implementation by the executive branch, are therefore hard to
shield from public view and the public is thus able to mobilize in
response and to exercise control over the legislative and executive
branches through the political process. Courts, on the other hand,
resolve specific disputes that generally involve a small number of
parties. And, as we saw in Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc., courts
sometimes do not even allow the public to see their decisions. 387
Moreover, although court rulings can have broadly felt effects, the
public has no direct channels of political recourse to respond to the
actions of the courts. Heidi Kitrosser describes the important distinction
between political and adjudicative activities as follows:
[O]ne can roughly distinguish political from adjudicative activities
because political activities generally involve making or implementing
broadly applicable policy decisions while adjudicative activities
generally involve decisions regarding discrete litigants. Political
activities are generally attached to avenues for political recourse
while adjudicative activities are generally disconnected from or
Id. at 1667.
Id. (quoting Address of John Marshall (Dec. 11, 1829), in PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF
THE VIRGINIA STATE CONVENTION OF 1829–1830 615, 616 (1830)).
384 See Bhagwat, Patronage and the First Amendment, supra note 283, at 1386.
385 ELY, supra note 295, at 102.
386 Id. at 103.
387 527 F.3d 358, 371 (3d Cir.) (affirming sealing of case, including district court’s decisions),
order clarified, 543 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 2008).
382
383
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connected only remotely to such avenues. Further, political activities
are generally legitimized by their connection to political channels
whereas adjudicative activities are generally legitimized by
procedural constraints and other norms of reason and fairness in
decision-making. 388

Kitrosser’s conclusion that adjudicative activities are legitimized by
procedural constraints and norms of reason and fairness further
supports the need for public access to the courts. Nearly all of the
constraints imposed on the courts stem from due process and other
procedural protections. The legitimacy of the courts therefore rests on
the public’s assurance that these protections are being followed by
judges, a fact that did not escape the framers who included a right to a
public trial in all criminal cases and a right to a jury trial in civil cases
under the Sixth and Seventh Amendments respectively. 389 Judges also
recognize that their legitimacy rests on public oversight. As Judge Frank
Easterbrook has noted: “The political branches of government claim
legitimacy by election, judges by reason. Any step that withdraws an
element of the judicial process from public view makes the ensuing
decision look more like fiat and requires rigorous justification.”390 Recall
Jeremy Bentham’s admonition quoted in the introduction that
“[p]ublicity is the very soul of justice.” 391 Bentham later explained why
this is so: “It keeps the judge himself, while trying, under trial.” 392 Public
access to the courts thus serves as an essential check on judges and, by
extension, the power of government. 393
Third, the courts play an important performative role in a
democracy. In the words of Judith Resnik, “[o]pen court proceedings
enable people to watch, debate, develop, contest, and materialize the
exercise of both public and private power.” 394 This view is echoed by
Robert Post, whose “participatory” theory of self-governance rests on
“the processes through which citizens come to identify a government as

Kitrosser, supra note 27, at 134–35.
See Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57
MINN. L. REV. 639, 667–69, 678–79 (1973) (describing how the Seventh Amendment was
intended to be a restraint on government power).
390 Hicklin Eng’g, L.C. v. Bartell, 439 F.3d 346, 348 (7th Cir. 2006), abrogated by RTP L.L.C.
v. ORIX Real Estate Capital, Inc., 827 F.3d 689 (7th Cir. 2016).
391 BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, supra note 1, at 316.
392 Id.
393 Vincent Blasi has written extensively about the role of the First Amendment in checking
government power. According to Blasi, “[t]he check on government must come from the power
of public opinion, which in turn rests on the power of the populace to retire officials at the
polls, to withdraw the minimal cooperation required for effective governance, and ultimately to
make a revolution.” Blasi, Checking Value, supra note 274, at 539.
394 Resnik, supra note 367, at 54.
388
389
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their own.” 395 Indeed, the courts are, as Resnik points out, at the center
of a range of democratic practices: “Courts can be sites in which
democratic norms of equal treatment, of popular engagement with legal
rulemaking, and of constrained government authority are put into
practice.” 396 As Resnik observes, the “normative obligations of judges in
both criminal and civil proceedings to hear the other side, to welcome
‘everyone’ as an equal, to be independent of the government that
employs and deploys them, and to provide public processes
enable . . . democratic discourse[].” 397
Finally, unlike the other branches of government, the work of the
courts is fundamentally about the discovery and disclosure of
information. Judges and juries sift through conflicting claims and base
their decisions on evidence and arguments presented in “open court.” 398
In practical terms, the courts serve an “information forcing” role for the
government because the courts are where government power is
contested, defined, and ultimately actualized. As David Pozen notes:
“The quintessential structural feature of the Constitution, the
distribution of powers across the coordinate branches, serves as an
information-forcing device. To fulfill its responsibilities, each branch is
required both to give and receive information from the others.” 399 This
forced information sharing—among branches of the government and
between the government and the people—is an essential part of our
constitutional system. Courts, because of the nature of their work, sit at
the critical interface between the government and the public. As a result,
public access to the courts aids in legitimizing the exercise of all
governmental powers.
III. AN ANALYTICALLY COHERENT PUBLIC ACCESS DOCTRINE
In this Part we move from theory to application. As the preceding
discussion has shown, the central purpose of the First Amendment is to
ensure that citizens can effectively participate in and contribute to our
republican system of government. In order to effectuate this goal, the
First Amendment must embody an affirmative right of access to the
courts, which, by virtue of their unique institutional position, possess

Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine, supra note 273, at 2367.
Resnik, supra note 367, at 4.
397 Id. at 53.
398 See Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Attorney Gen., 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (“The theory of
our system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and
argument in open court . . . .”).
399 David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 300 (2010).
395
396
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information that is essential for the public to evaluate governmental
power and to act as sovereigns over the government. 400
Although the conclusion that the First Amendment embodies an
affirmative right of access to the courts marks a significant expansion in
our current understanding of the First Amendment’s scope, the
implementation of such a right can proceed largely through the
application of established First Amendment doctrines. As with other
First Amendment rights, the right of public access would not be
absolute. In evaluating public access claims, a court should start with a
presumption that the public has a First Amendment right of access to all
court proceedings and filed records that are material to a court’s
exercise of its adjudicatory power. This presumption can, in appropriate
circumstances, be overcome when the countervailing interests
supporting secrecy are compelling. Before closure can be ordered,
however, courts must conclude that the proposed restrictions are
narrowly tailored and that there are no other alternatives to closure.
The following Sections describe these requirements in greater
detail.
A.

Ensuring a Presumption of Public Access

The Supreme Court’s experience and logic test should be
abandoned and replaced with a presumption that the public has a First
Amendment right of access to all court proceedings and filed records
that are material to a court’s exercise of its adjudicatory power. 401 As
explained in Part I, the current test for deciding whether a First
Amendment right of access attaches to a particular proceeding or record
is not based on sound constitutional principles. 402 Moreover, it fails to
guide judges in difficult cases and leads to inconsistent results. 403
There are a number of benefits that would flow from adopting a
presumptive First Amendment right of public access. First, it would
eliminate the uncertainty regarding whether a First Amendment
See supra Section II.B.
For purposes of determining whether a right of access exists, proceedings and records
should be considered material to a court’s exercise of its adjudicatory power whenever they are
relevant to the core judicial function of determining the facts and the law applicable to the case.
Assessing the materiality of information is something that judges do in a wide range of
contexts, including securities regulation, see THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES
REGULATION § 12:6 (4th ed. 2002), and perjury, see Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770
(1988) (stating that a false statement is material if it had “‘a natural tendency to influence, or
was capable of influencing, the decision of’ the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed”
(quoting Weinstock v. United States, 231 F.2d 699, 701 (1956))).
402 See supra Section I.A.
403 See supra Section I.B.
400
401
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standard or a common-law standard should govern access claims. No
longer will courts need to scrutinize the history and logic of openness in
order to determine whether the values underlying the First Amendment
are implicated by public access to a particular court proceeding or
record. Instead, courts will apply a single test for access and can
immediately engage in the far more critical examination of whether the
interests supporting secrecy are sufficiently compelling to justify
closure. Raleigh Hannah Levine, who advocates applying a strict
scrutiny test to all denials of public access to adjudicative proceedings,
notes that applying such a rule would “offer consistency and clarity,
protect judges so that they can make unpopular decisions, prevent the
appearance and actuality of outcome-driven analyses, and stay flexible
enough to allow closure in the limited cases in which it is genuinely
necessary.” 404
Second, adopting a presumptive First Amendment right of access
will send a clear signal to judges and the public that the work of the
courts is both relevant and important to the public. As Vincent Blasi has
noted, First Amendment doctrines that embody clear principles, such as
the prohibition against prior restraints, 405 have “thrust.” 406 That is, their
use “represents a notable value commitment that says much about how
particular disputes will be adjudicated.” 407 In comparison, Blasi points
out that multi-factor balancing tests and context-dependent standards
“do[] not provide a strong indication of how a particular dispute will be
resolved.” 408 This is not to say that the right of access must be absolute
in order to serve this signaling function. Even a qualified right can
communicate clear principles:
A mode of analysis that emphasizes principles . . . can broaden the
perspective of the decisionmaker and make the regulatory concerns
of the moment seem less monumental. . . . A legal culture that talks
and thinks in terms of principles is somewhat less likely, by virtue of
that mode of discourse, to trivialize its ideals in the process of caseby-case application, or lose the capacity to subject its ad hoc,
pragmatic impulses to some form of discipline. 409

Levine, supra note 27, at 1745.
See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (“Any system of prior
restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its
constitutional validity.”); see also Ardia, Freedom of Speech, supra note 302, at 34–38
(discussing the differences between the First Amendment’s treatment of prior restraints and
subsequent sanctions).
406 Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
449, 473 (1985).
407 Id.
408 Id.
409 Id. at 474.
404
405
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Third, a presumptive First Amendment right of access will force
the proponents of closure to justify restrictions on public access by
demonstrating that the restrictions on access are necessary to advance a
compelling interest. Courts will not be able to fall back on ad-hoc
balancing that tends to discount the values of openness, but will instead
have to issue findings “specific enough that a reviewing court can
determine whether the closure order was properly entered.” 410 As
discussed below, the courts can draw guidance on performing this task
from the large, and growing, body of First Amendment case law
applying strict scrutiny. 411 Of course, this will make closures less
common, but that is in keeping with the Court’s directive that “[c]losed
proceedings . . . must be rare and only for cause shown that outweighs
the value of openness.” 412
Applying a First Amendment right of public access to all court
proceedings and filed records that are material to a court’s exercise of its
adjudicatory power will undoubtedly result in an expansion of public
access rights. 413 Yet a number of lower courts already impose a First
Amendment right of access outside the criminal trial context. In fact,
lower courts have held that a First Amendment right of access applies to
almost all pretrial, mid-trial, and post-trial criminal proceedings,
including: suppression hearings, 414 bail hearings, 415 entrapment
hearings, 416 change of venue hearings, 417 competency hearings, 418
hearings on the disqualification or withdrawal of counsel, 419 judicial
recusal hearings, 420 plea hearings, 421 hearings to reduce a sentence,422
Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984).
See infra notes 448–58 and accompanying text.
412 Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 509.
413 A presumptive First Amendment right of access would not extend to proceedings or
documents that are not material to a court’s exercise of its adjudicatory power or to unfiled
materials. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32–33 (1984) (denying a First
Amendment right of access to unfiled discovery material and noting that “[m]uch of the
information that surfaces during pretrial discovery may be unrelated, or only tangentially
related, to the underlying cause of action”).
414 See, e.g., In re Herald Co., 734 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d
1162 (9th Cir. 1982); Associated Press v. Bell, 510 N.E.2d 313 (N.Y. 1987); State ex rel.
Repository v. Unger, 504 N.E.2d 37 (Ohio 1986) (per curiam).
415 See, e.g., In re Globe Newspapers Co., 729 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1984); United States v.
Chagra, 701 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1983); State v. Williams, 459 A.2d 641 (N.J. 1983).
416 See, e.g., United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550 (3d Cir. 1982).
417 See, e.g., In re Charlotte Observer, 882 F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 1989); Ex parte Birmingham
News Co., 624 So. 2d 1117 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993).
418 See, e.g., In re Times-World Corp., 488 S.E.2d 677 (Va. Ct. App. 1997).
419 See, e.g., In re Nat’l Broad. Co., 828 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1987); United States v. Ellis, 154
F.R.D. 692 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
420 See, e.g., In re Nat’l Broad. Co., 828 F.2d 340.
421 See, e.g., In re Wash. Post, 807 F.2d 383 (4th Cir. 1986).
422 See, e.g., United States v. Milken, 780 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
410
411
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and post-trial hearings relating to allegations of juror misconduct. 423 In
the rare instance when a court has not found a public right of access to a
criminal proceeding, it has done so because secrecy plays a critical role
in the proceeding in question and public access would “destroy[] the
effectiveness” of the proceeding. 424
Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue
of whether a First Amendment right of access extends to civil
proceedings, it has noted that “historically both civil and criminal trials
have been presumptively open.” 425 Indeed, the Court has observed that
“in some civil cases the public interest in access . . . may be as strong as,
or stronger than, in most criminal cases.” 426 Returning again to the case
that opened the introduction to this Article, Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection
Plus, Inc., it is clear that this is no run-of-the-mill lawsuit. As the Third
Circuit itself remarked, the case raised a matter of first impression in the
circuit: whether the protections afforded under the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act extend to women who have elected to terminate
their pregnancies. 427 How can the public know the extent and
effectiveness of the nation’s anti-discrimination laws if it cannot see the
application of these laws in specific cases?
Recognizing the importance of public access to civil proceedings,
most federal appellate courts already apply a First Amendment right of
access to civil cases, 428 as do a number of state supreme courts. 429 For
See, e.g., United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994).
See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 823 F.2d 111, 117 (5th Cir. 1987) (concluding that
public access to a mid-trial inquiry into juror misconduct would “substantially raise the risk of
destroying the effectiveness of the jury as a deliberative body”); United States v. Gonzales, 150
F.3d 1246, 1264–65 (10th Cir. 1998) (rejecting a right of access to Criminal Justice Act (CJA)
proceedings and records because access would have a negative impact on the functioning of
CJA process, given the importance of confidentiality to that process). Courts also have
consistently held that there is no First Amendment right of access to grand jury proceedings.
See, e.g., United States v. Index Newspapers L.L.C., 766 F.3d 1072, 1084 (9th Cir. 2014)
(“Because the grand jury is an integral part of the criminal investigatory process, these
proceedings are always held in secret.”); In re N.Y. Times Co. to Unseal Wiretap & Search
Warrant Materials, 577 F.3d 401, 410 n.4 (2d Cir. 2009) (“All grand jury
proceedings . . . traditionally have been nonpublic.”).
425 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 n.17 (1980) (plurality
opinion); see also Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) (“A trial is a public event. What
transpires in the court room is public property.”).
426 Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 386 n.15 (1979); see also Publicker Indus., Inc.
v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 1984) (“Public access to civil trials, no less than criminal
trials, plays an important role in the participation and the free discussion of governmental
affairs.”); Chi. Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 258 (7th Cir. 1975) (“Civil litigation
in general often exposes the need for governmental action or correction. Such revelations
should not be kept from the public.”).
427 Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 363 (3d Cir.), order clarified, 543 F.3d 178
(3d Cir. 2008).
428 See, e.g., Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, 750 F.3d 776, 786 (9th Cir. 2014); Grove Fresh
Distribs., Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co., 24 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 1994); Republic of Philippines v.
423
424
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example, a unanimous California Supreme Court concluded that
extending a First Amendment right of access to civil proceedings was
fully in keeping with United States Supreme Court precedent:
“Although the high court’s opinions in Richmond Newspapers, Globe,
Press-Enterprise I, and Press-Enterprise II all arose in the criminal
context, the reasoning of these decisions suggests that the First
Amendment right of access extends beyond the context of criminal
proceedings and encompasses civil proceedings as well.” 430
The majority of federal circuits also have held that a First
Amendment right of access attaches to court records submitted in
connection with criminal proceedings, 431 as have several state supreme
courts. 432 Many courts also recognize a First Amendment right of access

Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653, 659 (3d Cir. 1991); Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine,
Inc., 846 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1988); FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404 (1st Cir.
1987); Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984); Publicker
Indus., Inc., 733 F.2d 1059; In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 1984); In re Iowa
Freedom of Info. Council, 724 F.2d 658, 661 (8th Cir. 1983); Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1178 (6th Cir. 1983); Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796 (11th
Cir. 1983). Only the D.C. Circuit has held to the contrary. See Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 935 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“[N]either this Court nor the Supreme
Court has ever indicated that it would apply the Richmond Newspapers test to anything other
than criminal judicial proceedings.”).
429 See, e.g., NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court, 980 P.2d 337, 358 (Cal.
1999); Mokhiber v. Davis, 537 A.2d 1100, 1107–08 (D.C. 1988); Barron v. Fla. Freedom
Newspapers, Inc., 531 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1988); Roman Catholic Diocese of Lexington v. Noble, 92
S.W.3d 724, 733 (Ky. 2002); N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. J.B., 576 A.2d 261 (N.J. 1990);
Rapid City Journal v. Delaney, 2011 SD 55, 804 N.W.2d 388.
430 NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc., 980 P.2d at 358.
431 See, e.g., In re Providence Journal Co., Inc., 293 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2002); United States v.
Valenti, 987 F.2d 708, 710 (11th Cir. 1993); Wash. Post v. Robinson, 935 F.2d 282, 283 (D.C.
Cir. 1991); In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Gunn, 855 F.2d 569, 573
(8th Cir. 1988); In re N.Y. Times Co., 828 F.2d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 1987); In re Storer Commc’ns,
Inc., 828 F.2d 330, 336 (6th Cir. 1987); United States v. Edwards, 823 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir.
1987); In re Wash. Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 390 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Peters, 754 F.2d
753, 763 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104, 1111 (3d Cir. 1985); Associated
Press v. U.S. Dist. Court, 705 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1983). The Tenth Circuit has avoided
deciding whether there is a First Amendment right of access to criminal and civil court records.
See, e.g., Riker v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 315 F. App’x 752, 756 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Even
assuming, without deciding, that there is a First Amendment right to court documents, that
right is not absolute. . . . [A]ny interest Mr. Jordan has is outweighed by the safety needs of Mr.
Riker.”); United States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 812 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[F]or the purposes of
this opinion, we assume without deciding that access to judicial documents is governed by the
analysis articulated in Press-Enterprise II.”).
432 See, e.g., State v. Ross, 543 A.2d 284, 285 (Conn. 1988); Oahu Publ’ns Inc. v. Ahn, 331
P.3d 460, 485 (Haw. 2014); Commonwealth v. Doe, 648 N.E.2d 1255, 1258 (Mass. 1995),
abrogated by Commonwealth v. Pon, 14 N.E.3d 182 (Mass. 2014); In re VV Publ’g Corp., 577
A.2d 412, 417–18 (N.J. 1990); Nichols v. Jackson, 2002 OK 65, ¶ 12, 55 P.3d 1044, 1046; State v.
Archuleta, 857 P.2d 234, 239 (Utah 1993); Circuit Court of Eighth Judicial Dist. v. Lee
Newspapers, 2014 WY 101, 332 P.3d 523, 530 (Wyo. 2014).
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to records in civil proceedings. 433 In fact, it makes little sense to treat
court proceedings and court records differently under the First
Amendment, given that trials and other courtroom proceedings make
up only a small portion of the work of the courts. 434 Moreover,
excluding court records from the First Amendment’s reach would
significantly diminish the benefits of public access. As the Third Circuit
remarked in United States v. Antar:
Access to the documentation of an open proceeding . . . facilitates the
openness of the proceeding itself by assuring the broadest
dissemination. It would be an odd result indeed were we to declare
that our courtrooms must be open, but that transcripts of the
proceedings occurring there may be closed, for what exists of the
right of access if it extends only to those who can squeeze through
the door? 435

B.

Evaluating Countervailing Interests

The presumptive right of public access described above would be a
qualified right. As the Supreme Court has made clear, even a First
Amendment right of access can be denied when the countervailing
interests supporting closure are sufficiently compelling. Although the
Supreme Court has used slightly different wording when evaluating
433 See, e.g., Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 267 (4th Cir. 2014); Newsday L.L.C. v. Cty. of
Nassau, 730 F.3d 156, 164 (2d Cir. 2013); Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 86,
93 (2d Cir. 2004); Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc., 24 F.3d at 897; Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion
Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 164 (3d Cir. 1993); Rushford, 846 F.2d at 253; In re Cont’l Ill. Sec.
Litig., 732 F.2d at 1309; Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 710 F.2d at 1177; Ex parte Capital
U-Drive-It, Inc., 630 S.E.2d 464, 469 (S.C. 2006). But see In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of
the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1331–40 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (finding no First Amendment right to
discovery materials); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 908
(E.D. Pa. 1981) (“With respect to the question whether the common law right to inspect and
copy [discovery materials] has a constitutional dimension, we conclude that it does not.”).
434 See, e.g., Hartford Courant Co., 380 F.3d at 93 (warning that “the ability of the public and
press to attend civil and criminal cases would be merely theoretical if the information provided
by docket sheets were inaccessible”); Wash. Legal Found. v. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 89 F.3d
897, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[A]ll of the documents filed with the court, as well as the transcript
of the proceeding itself, are maintained as the official ‘record’ of what transpired.”). This is the
approach taken by the American Bar Association, which has promulgated standards
recommending that there should be a public right of access to “all judicial proceedings, related
documents and exhibits, and any record made thereof,” subject to specific narrowly defined
circumstances. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 8-5.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). In the
commentary to an earlier version of the standards, the ABA stated that its position was
intended to conform to the Supreme Court’s recognition in Richmond Newspapers of a First
Amendment-based right of access premised on the “‘structural’ design of the Constitution to
guarantee a self-informed citizenry.” STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 8-3.2 cmt. at 23 (AM.
BAR ASS’N 1991).
435 38 F.3d 1348, 1360 (3d Cir. 1994).
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restrictions on access—sometimes requiring that closure be “essential to
preserve higher values” 436 and at other times stating that restrictions
must be “necessitated by a compelling governmental interest” 437—the
test otherwise matches the Court’s strict scrutiny test as applied in other
First Amendment contexts. 438
Strict scrutiny essentially involves a two-part, “ends and means”
inquiry. 439 A court must first make a normative judgment about the
ends: Is the interest in closure important enough to justify the
restriction on public access? If so, the next step involves a “primarily
empirical judgment about the means.” 440 As Eugene Volokh notes, “If
the means do not actually further the interest, are too broad, are too
narrow, or are unnecessarily burdensome, then the government can and
should serve the end through [alternative means].” 441
If a court concludes that public access may be restricted, it must
then articulate specific on-the-record findings justifying its
conclusion. 442 As the Supreme Court instructed in Press-Enterprise I:
The presumption of openness may be overcome only by an
overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to
preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.
The interest is to be articulated along with findings specific enough
that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was
properly entered. 443

Given the wide variety of disputes that come before the courts, it
should come as no surprise that court proceedings and records are
awash with private and sensitive information about the litigants,
witnesses, jurors, and others who come into contact with the court
system. For example, information ranging from bank account numbers
to details about an individual’s past sexual activity can appear in court
files raising, among other concerns, the risk of identity theft and
436 Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1986) (“[P]roceedings cannot be closed unless
specific, on the record findings are made demonstrating that ‘closure is essential to preserve
higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.’” (quoting Press-Enterprise I, 464
U.S. 501, 510 (1984))).
437 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606–07 (1982) (“Where . . . the
State attempts to deny the right of access . . . it must be shown that the denial is necessitated by
a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”).
438 See, e.g., Kamasinski v. Judicial Review Council, 44 F.3d 106, 109 (2d Cir. 1994)
(concluding that “strict scrutiny is the correct standard” to be applied in access disputes
governed by the First Amendment).
439 See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict
Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2418 (1996).
440 Id. at 2419.
441 Id.
442 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980) (plurality opinion).
443 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984).
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reputational harm. 444 For businesses and other organizations, court
proceedings may disclose trade secrets and other confidential business
information that can lead to substantial economic harm. 445 For the
government, information disclosed in court proceedings and records,
such as the names of confidential informants and descriptions of
intelligence gathering techniques, can potentially harm national security
or undermine law enforcement efforts. 446 Moreover, public access to
criminal proceedings and records can result in significant prejudice to a
defendant’s right to a fair trial. 447
The full list of interests that public access might implicate is too
long to recount here, but judges can find guidance in evaluating these
interests by reviewing the extensive body of precedent applying strict
scrutiny in public access and other First Amendment contexts. 448 In
Press-Enterprise I, for example, the Supreme Court applied strict
scrutiny to the closure of voir dire proceedings. 449 In that case the trial
judge asserted two interests in support of his closure orders: “[T]he right
of the defendant to a fair trial, and the right to privacy of the prospective
jurors.” 450 The Court found little reason to question the lower court’s
conclusion that these interests were compelling, noting that “the right of
an accused to fundamental fairness in the jury selection process is a
compelling interest.” 451 As to the interest in juror privacy, the Court
stated that “[t]he jury selection process may, in some circumstances,
give rise to a compelling interest of a prospective juror when
interrogation touches on deeply personal matters that person has
legitimate reasons for keeping out of the public domain.” 452
444 See, e.g., Ardia & Klinefelter, supra note 33, at 1835–50 (identifying 140 distinct types of
sensitive information in court records).
445 See, e.g., Kyle J. Mendenhall, Note, Can You Keep a Secret? The Court’s Role in Protecting
Trade Secrets and Other Confidential Business Information from Disclosure in Litigation, 62
DRAKE L. REV. 885 (2014).
446 See Arthur L. Burnett, Sr., The Potential for Injustice in the Use of Informants in the
Criminal Justice System, 37 SW. L. REV. 1079, 1082–83 (2008).
447 See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 356–61 (1966) (discussing the prejudicial
impact of pretrial publicity and a judge’s duty to protect the defendant’s constitutional right to
a fair trial).
448 Although the origin of the strict scrutiny test is obscure, the Supreme Court’s first
application of a compelling interest requirement in the First Amendment context occurred as
early as 1958 in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial
Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1279 (2007) (noting the first appearance of a compelling
interest test in Speiser and concluding that “it is certainly fair to say that before the 1964
McLaughlin [v. Florida] decision, First Amendment free speech cases had begun to develop
both a vocabulary and a set of doctrinal ideas that would shortly coalesce into the modern strict
scrutiny test”).
449 Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984).
450 Id.
451 Id.
452 Id. at 511.
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Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the trial court’s closure orders
were improper because they were “unsupported by findings showing
that an open proceeding in fact threatened those interests.” 453
Gerald Gunther famously declared that strict scrutiny is “‘strict’ in
theory and fatal in fact.” 454 Yet the test has not proven to be an
insurmountable obstacle in First Amendment cases. In a comprehensive
empirical study of all strict scrutiny cases in federal courts from 1990
through 2003, Adam Winkler found that government regulation of
speech survived strict scrutiny in twenty-two percent of the cases. 455
Moreover, in the context of public access to court proceedings and
records, Winkler found that fifty percent of closure orders survived
strict scrutiny. 456 According to Winkler’s study, the courts uniformly
permitted restrictions on access to grand jury proceedings and
restrictions designed to protect minors. 457 By contrast, Winkler found
that courts were “relatively hostile to denials of access to ordinary
criminal proceedings and records.” 458
Some court proceedings and records will undoubtedly remain
closed under this new presumptive First Amendment test while others
will have to be open. Grand jury proceedings, for example, will likely
stay closed because secrecy is integral to the grand jury’s screening and
investigatory functions. 459 Many juvenile delinquency proceedings, on
the other hand, will have to be open unless closure is justified on a caseby-case basis, a situation that a number of juvenile justice reformers
have argued for. 460
This case-by-case consideration of the interests closure advances is
one of the primary benefits of a presumptive right of access under the
Id. at 510–11.
Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
455 Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 844 (2006).
456 Id. at 849.
457 Id. (finding that courts allowed the restriction in 100% of the cases he reviewed).
458 Id. at 850 (finding that courts allowed the restriction in only sixteen percent of the cases).
459 See, e.g., Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 9 (1986) (“[T]he proper functioning of our grand
jury system depends upon the secrecy of grand jury proceedings” (quoting Douglas Oil Co. v.
Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 218 (1979))); United States v. Index Newspapers L.L.C., 766
F.3d 1072, 1084 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Because the grand jury is an integral part of the criminal
investigatory process, these proceedings are always held in secret.”).
460 See, e.g., Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order:
The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1120–29 (1991); Emily
Bazelon, Note, Public Access to Juvenile and Family Court: Should the Courtroom Doors Be
Open or Closed?, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 155, 192–93 (1999); Kelly Crecco, Note, Striking a
Balance: Freedom of the Press Versus Children's Privacy Interests in Juvenile Dependency
Hearings, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 490, 525–32 (2013); see also Kathleen S. Bean, Changing the
Rules: Public Access to Dependency Court, 79 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 54 (2001) (asserting that
public access can check the shortcuts and abuses in juvenile dependency proceedings).
453
454
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First Amendment. Under the current experience and logic test, the
public is foreclosed from accessing entire classes of court proceedings
and records because they fail the threshold test for a First Amendment
right of access. Under the proposed test, courts will have to evaluate
each closure and sealing independently to determine whether the
interests supporting closure are compelling and whether the means
chosen to limit access are narrowly tailored. Some court proceedings
and records will—and should—remain closed, but wholesale closures
will no longer be the norm.
C.

Expanding Access to the Courts

As courts consider how to implement a right of access, they should
remain cognizant that many of the benefits that flow from public access
can only be achieved if the public actually takes advantage of this access.
Not everyone, of course, can or even desires to attend court proceedings
in person. In our nation’s early history, attending trials was a common
mode of “passing the time.” 461 Today, most people rely on surrogates,
particularly the media, to inform them about the work of the courts. 462
The courts, like many parts of the government, are in the midst of a
transformation from the paper-based world of the twentieth century to
an interconnected, electronic world where physical and temporal
barriers to information are eroding. Over the past decade, courts across
the country have been moving with alacrity to digitize their records and
make them available to the public online. 463 A number of courts have
also adopted or are considering adopting other forms of electronic
access to their records and courtrooms. For example, Kansas and Utah
amended their court rules in 2012 to allow some observers to use cell
phones and laptop computers to report from their courtrooms. 464
The move to allow electronic access to the courts has brought, and
will continue to bring, substantial benefits to the public and to the
courts themselves. 465 The committee of judges and attorneys that
461 6 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1834 (James H. Chadbourn rev.,
Little, Brown & Co. 1976).
462 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572–73 (1980) (plurality opinion)
(“Instead of acquiring information about trials by firsthand observation or by word of mouth
from those who attended, people now acquire it chiefly through the print and electronic
media.”).
463 See Ardia & Klinefelter, supra note 33, at 1826.
464 See Cathy Packer, Should Courtroom Observers Be Allowed to Use Their Smartphones and
Computers in Court? An Examination of the Arguments, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 573, 591
(2013).
465 See KEVIN P. KILPATRICK, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, THE ELECTRONIC
HANDSHAKE: PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT DATABASES 1–3 (1995) (describing how electronic
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drafted Utah’s amended rule wrote that “[p]ermitting electronic media
coverage will allow the public to actually see and hear what transpires in
the courtroom, and to become better educated and informed about the
work of the courts.” 466 Similarly, in Kansas the preface to the amended
rules states that “electronic devices are redefining the news media” and
that future court policies
should include enough flexibility to take into consideration that
electronic devices have become a necessary tool for court observers,
journalists, and participants and continue to rapidly change and
evolve. The courts should champion the enhanced access and the
transparency made possible by use of these devices while protecting
the integrity of proceedings within the courtroom. 467

Electronic access to court proceedings and records makes it
possible for the benefits of court transparency to be widely dispersed
throughout society. 468 By facilitating remote access to the court system
and its records, many more people can stay informed—and inform their
fellow citizens. Electronic access also has a leveraging effect because it
makes it possible for the media and other interested parties to cover
court proceedings at a lower cost and allows for greater depth of analysis
at a time when many media organizations are cutting back on the
number of reporters assigned full-time to the courts. 469
public access systems can aid court administrators); J. DOUGLAS WALKER, NAT’L CTR. FOR
STATE COURTS, ELECTRONIC COURT DOCUMENTS: AN ASSESSMENT OF JUDICIAL ELECTRONIC
DOCUMENT AND DATA INTERCHANGE TECHNOLOGY 15 (1999) (“With the nearly continuous
rise in volume and complexity of the paperwork involved in the judicial process . . . technology
and electronic communications could offer a better alternative to the flood of paper forms and
documents.”).
466 STATE OF UTAH JUDICIAL COUNCIL STUDY COMM. ON TECH. BROUGHT INTO THE
COURTROOM, FINAL REPORT 11 (2012), http://www.rcfp.org/sites/default/files/docs/20120501_
130338_utah_camerasreport.pdf.
467 KAN. SUP. CT. R. 1001(a).
468 See, e.g., Lynn E. Sudbeck, Placing Court Records Online: Balancing Judicial
Accountability with Public Trust and Confidence: An Analysis of State Court Electronic Access
Policies and a Proposal for South Dakota Court Records, 51 S.D. L. REV. 81, 91 (2006) (noting
that a “frequently mentioned benefit” of electronic access to court records is that it responds “to
the needs of South Dakota’s rural court users, that is, [it] ‘levels the geographic playing field’ by
allowing persons located in great distances from the courthouse to access public information”
(citation omitted)).
469 Lucy Dalglish, former executive director of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press, highlighted the important role that court records play for the media in testimony before
the Privacy Subcommittee of the Judicial Conference Standing Committee on the Federal Rules:
We are in a situation where there are a lot fewer journalists in mainstream news
organizations. By having easy access to this information, they are able to do a better
job of reporting the news to the public. There are some jurisdictions—probably not
Manhattan, but certainly in places like Utah—where you have many local
newspapers and really only one federal court that covers an enormous geographic
area. Now they are able to accurately and completely report news stories as well.
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The movement by courts to increase electronic public access,
however, has not escaped criticism from those who worry that such
efforts will result in privacy harms due to the widespread disclosure of
sensitive and private information. 470 As a result, court administrators,
judges, lawyers, and legislators are in active discussion about how to
navigate the transition to electronic public access, with some
recommending a substantial curtailment of public access through
redaction of electronic and print records, restricted public access to
court proceedings, removal of categories of court records from Internet
access, and increased filing of court documents under seal. 471
The debate over how to balance public access and secrecy is an
important one, but it cannot be resolved based on abstract assessments
of the benefits and harms associated with public access to court
proceedings and records. As courts consider how best to implement a
First Amendment right of access to the courts, it will be essential that
they keep in mind the structural values advanced by public access and
the need to ensure that information about the courts is widely circulated
so that the benefits of public access can be realized.
CONCLUSION
Information is power. If citizens are the ultimate sovereigns, as the
Constitution presupposes, they must have access to the information
necessary to evaluate the actions of their government. This fundamental
principle underlies the First Amendment’s structural role as a facilitator
of democratic control. Because the courts sit at the critical interface
where government power is contested, defined, and actualized, public
Symposium, Panel One: General Discussion on Privacy and Public Access to Court Files, 79
FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 13 (2010).
470 See, e.g., Steven C. Bennett, Pleadings, Privacy and Ethics: Protecting Privacy in Litigation
Documents, 2 REYNOLDS CTS. & MEDIA L.J. 25 (2012); Amanda Conley et al., Sustaining Privacy
and Open Justice in the Transition to Online Court Records: A Multidisciplinary Inquiry, 71 MD.
L. REV. 772 (2012); Will Thomas DeVries, Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age, 18 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 283, 301 (2003); Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and
the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137 (2002).
471 See, e.g., Natalie Gomez-Velez, Internet Access to Court Records—Balancing Public Access
and Privacy, 51 LOY. L. REV. 365 (2005) (recommending the use of protective orders and
sealing to remove from public view high risk data elements and describing some states’
decisions to exclude categories of court records from online systems); Kristin A. Henderson,
Lessons from Bankruptcy Court Public Records, 23 LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES Q. 55, 73, 76–77
(2004) (proposing the redaction of sensitive information from bankruptcy court records
accessible to the public through electronic case files); Caren Myers Morrison, Privacy,
Accountability, and the Cooperating Defendant: Towards a New Role for Internet Access to
Court Records, 62 VAND. L. REV. 921, 969–78 (2009) (recommending redaction of names of
cooperating defendants and other informants).
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access to the courts is essential to both the functioning and legitimacy of
our republican system of government.
More than thirty years ago, the Supreme Court acknowledged in
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia that “[i]n guaranteeing freedoms
such as those of speech and press, the First Amendment can be read as
protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as to give meaning to
those explicit guarantees.”472 Yet the Supreme Court never finished the
work it began in Richmond Newspapers. It never resolved the question
of whether the First Amendment right of access to criminal trials and
pre-trial proceedings extended to civil proceedings and to court records.
Moreover, in the intervening years, the Court’s access decisions
obscured the rationale for a First Amendment right of access and put
the lower courts on a path to a doctrinal dead end.
This Article puts the First Amendment right of access back on a
firm theoretical foundation by focusing on the structural role the First
Amendment plays in our constitutional system. In doing so, it provides
a principled way to distinguish a right of public access to the courts
from a general right of access to government information. As described
above, the courts play a unique structural role in society that makes a
right of public access to the information they contain particularly
compelling from the standpoint of self-governance.
This is a critical time to clarify the basis and scope of a First
Amendment right of access to the courts because the courts are in the
midst of a transformation from the largely paper-based world of the
twentieth century to an interconnected, electronic world where physical
and temporal barriers to information are diminishing. Because of these
changes, a debate over how to balance public access and secrecy is
taking place in courtrooms and legislatures across the country. As
courts consider how best to implement a First Amendment right of
access to the courts, it will be essential that they keep in mind that public
access serves a preeminent value in our society: democratic selfgovernance.

472

448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980) (plurality opinion).

